Сan ‘hume’s argument’ be considered a valid de nial of miracles?

Abstract

An important direction of theologians’ efforts to implement the task of renewing the doctrine of miracles is an attempt to give it a theoretically argued and psychologically convincing content, as well as such features that would not devalue it in the eyes of those who approach religion openly critically. Within this trend, a number of theologians are trying to highlight not only those issues that are on the agenda of today’s theological debates, but also those that have been inherited by theology from previous centuries. One of such important questions, in the refutation of which theologians prefer to rely on a reliable intellectual basis, is the so-called ‘Hume’s argument’, aimed at proving the obvious impossibility of miracles. The study of the works of the ideological opponents of the Scottish philosopher and the analysis of the specifics of the theoretical measures they resort to in opposition to D. Hume’s judgments allow us to understand the specificity and extent of the use of the ideological weapons possessed by the defenders of faith and which are aimed at refuting D. Hume’s thesis. In general, the criticism of the philosopher’s arguments is focused on two main directions and aims, first of all, to show the flaws in the fundamentals of his approach to the issue of miracles and, accordingly, their inability to act as a basis for a valid denial of miracles, as well as to clarify the purely intellectual dimension of the issue already from the standpoint of logic compliance and provide opportunities to establish judgments about the purely formal legitimacy of the philosopher’s claims to truth.