Climate policy as a tool of development containment: greenwashing and taxonomic fragmentation in a game-theoretic perspective

Abstract

The study provides a game-theoretic explanation of greenwashing and taxonomic fragmentation as rational strategies under localized regulatory logic. It demonstrates that the coexistence of multiple sustainable finance taxonomies and persistent greenwashing practices reflect strategic behavior rather than institutional failure. Greenwashing and interjurisdictional taxonomic arbitrage are shown to be functionally isomorphic strategies based on a common chain of information asymmetry, interpretive flexibility, manipulative redefinition, and rent extraction. The study establishes that taxonomic fragmentation represents a higher-order strategy that shifts regulatory conflict from compliance with common rules to the formation of those rules. The scientific novelty lies in the development of a game-theoretic framework that interprets greenwashing and taxonomic fragmentation as rational responses within climate regulation, and in introducing the concept of regulatory climate isomorphism.