

MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY

Public Security Academy

TRANSFORMATIONS, CHALLENGES AND SECURITY

Collective monograph



Mykolas Romeris
universitetas

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2.4. Strategic priorities in the development of Ukraine's security

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Abstract. *In the fourth part of the chapter, it is substantiated that new tasks*

are being formed to ensure the security of national economies, which are undergoing strategic revision taking into account the Russia-Ukraine war. The uncertainty and vulnerability of the current global environment are considered, which not only strengthen global challenges and exacerbate competition between states (global, regional) and regions, but also reveal the failure of collective means of resolving transnational problems, directly affecting the security of national economies.

Based on the results of the analysis of strategic documents related to ensuring the development of security, Ukraine's place in the system of priority actions of the EU-NATO strategic partnership is determined.

It is substantiated that effective work on ensuring the security of national economies is determined by the efficiency of national security systems, which are under the influence of global transformations. These changes create qualitatively new conditions in the security environment, and often become a source of challenges and threats to economic security. This, in turn, complicates the functioning of national economic security systems and increases the importance of international cooperation in this direction.

The existing system of support received by Ukraine is analyzed and directions of its further development are determined. The post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is identified as an important component of further progress towards Ukraine's membership in the EU and its involvement in the European security complex. The instrument to support and implement the latter should be the Program for Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and modernization in the context of preparing for the EU accession process and the transition to a green, digital, and inclusive economy (Ukraine Facility, 2024–2027).

This section also observes that by remaining outside NATO and the EU for a long time, Ukraine did not have the opportunity to be fully involved in the process of forming and developing a common European security architecture. Increasing Ukraine's participation in regional formats and initiatives will contribute to

strengthening both national and regional security.

Keywords: *economic security, security strategy, strategic security priorities, global challenges, global environment, European security complex.*

Introduction

The emergence of new challenges which intensify threats and increase risks to the formation of national economic security necessitates a review of strategic approaches to defining the economic component of national security. Over the past 5 years, the world has faced three powerful challenges that have heightened risks not only for regional security, but also for global security as a whole: the trade war between the world's largest economies, the US and China (2018–2019); the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021); and the 10-year war waged by Russia against Ukraine, the most acute and full-scale phase of which began on February 24, 2022.

Global experience in the development of security strategies indicates that most countries focus on military-political and defense aspects of security, with the exception of the most highly developed countries, which concentrate on the economic component of security. The large-scale aggression against Ukraine marked the beginning of a new era of economic security, where security should be considered not as a separate component of research, but as an integral part of all aspects of the existence and development of any state in the world.

The theoretical justification for the formation of security systems at the regional level is embodied in the concept of regional security complexes (Buzan et al., 1998). This concept focuses on the issue of security formation at the regional level, where the security of each individual actor is closely interdependent on other actors in the region. The development of regionalism and new regional agreements after World War II contributed to the emergence of new regional orders. These regional orders differ in their identity (Katzenstein, 2005), and are

characterized by their own security mechanisms (Lake & Morgan, 1997). As a result, a multi-regional system of international relations is forming in the global economy, based on several regional orders (Hurrell, 2007).

The formation of the European regional security complex was directly linked to the development of political and economic integration processes in the region. The Lisbon Development Program and the Europe 2020 strategy demonstrated a lack of focus on the internal market and showed a discrepancy between declared goals and implemented programs for sustainable and inclusive growth (Renda, 2017), which led to the adoption of a new Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (European Union, 2016).

New geopolitical and geo-economic realities highlight the practical aspects of ensuring a high level of European regional security, and developing relevant security strategies for European countries in the context of Ukraine's Eurointegration course. The post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is an important component of further progress on the path towards Ukraine's membership in the EU and its integration into the European security complex.

The goal of this article is to determine the main priorities for Ukraine's security development in the context of the strategic tasks of the European regional security complex. To achieve this goal, general scientific and special research methods are used, namely: the methods of analysis, abstraction, and synthesis (to determine the essence of the security component of Ukraine's economic development); the method of retrospective analysis (to determine the main stages and strategic principles of Ukraine's security development since its independence); and comparative analysis (to determine the directions of strategic partnership within the framework of the European security complex in the context of current geopolitical risks).

Main results

The economic security of the state should be a significant element of national

security as a whole, and its provision should undoubtedly be taken into account in economic development planning. The existing legal framework allows for a retrospective analysis of the main state documents (strategies, programs, resolutions, laws) defining the strategic principles of the socio-economic development of Ukraine during its independence:

1991 – adoption of the first legislative document in the field of foreign economic activity – the Law of Ukraine on Foreign Economic Activity (Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, 1991), which contained exclusive principles and mechanisms for conducting foreign economic activity and had no section devoted to issues of the economic security of the state or economic entities;

1993 – Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy (invalid in 2010) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1993), which declared the creation and maintenance of the state system of national security, including economic, political, defense, and environmental security;

2002 – influenced by increased attention paid to security issues following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in the President’s Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine entitled “European choice. Conceptual principles of the strategy of economic and social development of Ukraine for 2002–2011” (President of Ukraine, 2002) it was noted that security should be considered in view of the new (at that time) geopolitical situation. This document emphasized the priority of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and the prevention of contradictions with other strategic directions of the state’s foreign policy and economic activities, including Russia, the United States, CIS countries, Central and Southeastern Europe, and other regions of the world;

2004 – by Decree of the President of Ukraine, the Strategy of Economic and Social Development of Ukraine Towards European Integration for 2004–2015 (Halchynskyi & Heiets, 2004) was approved (invalid as of July 7, 2015), in which the final section was devoted to the strategy of ensuring economic and

environmental security. This section emphasized the absence of a comprehensive system for organizing the economic security of the state in the country and the imperfect legal framework for it. The document also emphasized that there was no monitoring of security threats in the country – accordingly, they were not taken into account in the implementation of economic policy;

2007 – the first edition of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine was adopted, which was slightly updated in 2012 (President of Ukraine, 2007). Despite the fact that the goal stated in this document includes the formation of a stable and growing market economy, and that the global financial crisis is recognized as the main challenge to national security, the main attention in determining the main security threats and formulating strategic goals and objectives was focused on socio-political (both internal and external) and defense aspects of security, while the issues of economic security were addressed quite superficially;

2010 – in the Law of Ukraine on the Principles of Internal and External Policy (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2010), one of the main principles of internal policy was defined as the priority of protecting national interests, while one of the principles of foreign policy was identified as maintaining defense against the threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of any foreign state. Economic policy in general was presented exclusively as directions of internal policy and a separate component among the principles of foreign policy – supporting the development of trade and the economic, scientific and technical, and investment cooperation of Ukraine with foreign states on the basis of mutual benefit and deepening integration;

2015 – in the Ukraine 2020 Sustainable Development Strategy (President of Ukraine, 2015b), it was determined that one of the four vectors of movement towards achieving the main goal – implementing European standards of living in Ukraine and bringing Ukraine up to leading positions in the world – is the security vector, the content of which consisted of ensuring guarantees of state, business,

and citizens' security, the protection of investments, and private property;

2015 – a new edition of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine was adopted (President of Ukraine, 2015a), in which the main threats to Ukraine's economic security were identified, including: low technological level of the economy, inefficient use of material resources, and irrational structure of industry; insufficient innovative component of economic development (including legislative); shadow economy; weak effectiveness in protecting the market from unfair competition; inefficient use of budget funds at various levels; dependence of the domestic market on external economic conditions; significant influence of foreign capital on the development of certain strategically important sectors of the national economy; and high currency risks;

2018 – the Law of Ukraine on National Security of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2018) was adopted, which established the basic principles of national security (mostly from the standpoint of defense issues) and defined the goals and bases of state policy aimed at guaranteeing effective protection against threats to every citizen and society as a whole;

2020 – in the National Security Strategy for 2020 (President of Ukraine, 2020), economic security is defined as a direction to ensure the priorities of national interests (sustainable development of the national economy and its integration into the European economic space), and among the security priorities are the development of human capital, counteraction of cyber threats, etc. The traditional list of security threats is complemented by rapid technological changes (primarily in energy and biotechnology), developments in the field of artificial intelligence, the likelihood of threats of biological origin, and the likelihood of the emergence and spread of both known and new infectious diseases. At the same time, as in previous editions, the Strategy for 2020 maintains a focus on the external and internal political components of security;

2021 – in the National Economic Strategy for the period up to 2030 (Cabinet

of Ministers of Ukraine, 2021c), which was adopted a year before the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine, the issue of economic security is mentioned exclusively in the mission and goal of the strategy, and national security through partnership and investment is named as one of the strategic orientations, principles, and values;

Thus, a retrospective analysis of the main documents on general issues of the economic development of Ukraine proves that security issues are usually recorded somewhat fragmentarily. For a long time, a separate document defining the strategic priorities of economic security formation was not adopted in the country.

The Strategy of Economic Security of Ukraine for the period up to 2025 became the first functional security strategy focusing on the economic component of national security. Unlike previous programmatic-strategic documents, where issues of economic security were reflected very briefly, often in a declarative and purely descriptive manner, this functional strategy contains analytical calculations that significantly enhance the substantiation of the positions it contains.

The real breakthrough in improving the process of strategic planning for Ukraine's economic security, both in terms of adopting programmatic-strategic documents and improving institutional support, occurred in 2021. The Strategy of Economic Security of Ukraine for the period up to 2025 (President of Ukraine, 2021), the Strategy of Energy Security (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2021a), the Strategy of Environmental Security and Climate Change Adaptation for the period up to 2030 (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2021b), and the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, 2021b) were all adopted in this year. A special economic state security institution, the Bureau of Economic Security, is being established in the country as the central executive authority, with its strategic goal being to ensure a secure direction for Ukraine's economy (i.e., the resilience of the national economy to external and internal threats) (Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, n.d.).

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In the 3 years between the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019 and the full-scale outbreak of the war in February 2022, Ukraine made some progress towards sustainable development in the following areas:

- 1) social (improvement of positions in the Human Development Index – 88th position in 2018, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity of \$3,095 in 2018, reduction of poverty levels, reduction of negative population growth);
- 2) economic (increase in the level of per capita foreign trade turnover, improvement of positions in the Doing Business ranking, maintaining a share in global goods exports);
- 3) environmental (tendency to reduce technogenic load per unit of GDP, reduction of consumption of conventional fuel in oil equivalent and electricity per unit of GDP, increase in consumption of electricity from renewable sources).

With the onset of military operations in Ukraine, the country's economy experienced a contraction of more than 30% in 2022, according to UN experts. This was due to massive infrastructure destruction, the disruption of production and trade activities, the disruption of logistical chains, a significant reduction in the workforce, and population displacement (United Nations, 2023). Therefore, the need to improve the country's economic security strategy is evident, which is currently influenced by the following challenges and threats: the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in the country and the associated food and energy crisis, a sharp increase in inflation, a growing debt burden, and climate change.

The adopted Strategy of Economic Security of Ukraine for the period up to

2025 requires restructuring and transforming key pathways to achieve goals and implement priorities of national interests in ensuring economic security. This is due, firstly, to the fact that implementation occurs under conditions of martial law, which is a qualitatively new challenge for the state's security system. Secondly, logically, in conditions of full-scale war, the state's main efforts are focused on military security and defense issues. However, there is already an urgent need to identify effective ways to restore and further ensure the security of the national economy in the post-war period in accordance with the strategic priorities of Ukraine's security development.

The implementation of Ukraine's European integration course, practically embodied in the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, becomes a relevant and top-priority task in shaping and ensuring security at both national and regional levels by deepening political, economic, and security partnerships between Ukraine and the EU. As of the beginning of 2023, the level of implementation of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on the part of Ukraine was 72%. The overall progress in fulfilling corresponding commitments by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was 70% for the 2014–2022 period. For the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, this figure stands at 61%, and for other state authorities, it is 59%.

According to Ukraine's Foreign Policy Strategy (President of Ukraine, 2021c), an important condition for improving the security environment in the country is the successful implementation of the European integration course for the development of the national economy, which, in turn, will significantly strengthen Ukraine's leadership position in the European region. Under current conditions and future prospects, joint partnership with the EU plays a key role in the security development of the national economy. The main factors of the security partnership between Ukraine and the EU include (Razumkov Center, 2021, p. 5):

- commonality and proximity of interests between Ukraine and the EU in

the security sphere;

- common assessment of security threats to the EU and national security in Ukraine;
- compatibility of values and the protection thereof;
- gradual increase in Ukraine's capabilities in ensuring European security.

In the system of international relations, for certain groups of countries, national security issues are interconnected. Thus, achieving security (counteracting relevant threats) becomes deeply intertwined with the issue of development. The theoretical justification for the formation of security systems at the regional level is embodied in the concept of regional security complexes (Buzan et al., 1998). This concept focuses on the formation of security at the level of geographic regions of the world, where the security of each individual actor is closely interdependent with other actors in the region. A Regional Security Complex (RSC) is defined as a group of states whose primary security interests are so closely interconnected that their national security systems cannot be considered separately from one another. The theory of regional security complexes, first proposed by Buzan and Wæver (2023, pp. 51–55), is based on identifying four interconnected levels of analysis:

- 1) the internal component of development within the states of the region (internal stability, etc.), which determines internal vulnerability;
- 2) interstate relations (regional level) between countries in the region;
- 3) the region's interaction with other regions (interregional level);
- 4) the role of global powers in the region, which determines the nature of interaction between global and regional security structures (global level).

Taking into account these levels of analysis, regional security complexes can develop in the direction of maintaining the status quo, which does not envisage any structural changes. However, it is more common for certain transformations to occur within regional security complexes, which are associated with the actions of internal or external factors. Accordingly, the structural transformation of the

regional security complex can be internal (deepening integration, confrontation between countries within the complex, etc.) or external (these transformations are primarily associated with changes in the composition of participants in the regional security complex). In any case, the basis for analyzing transformations is the state itself, which allows the vector of building regional security complexes to be determined. Bottom-up vectors emanate from the state, emphasizing its national interests in the regional formation, with corresponding common interests put to the fore. The nature of relations between regional and global levels of governance can, in turn, be defined as irrelevant, conflicting, or harmonious (Kacowicz, 2018).

The modern European collective defense system encompasses the following components: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU, and NATO. For a long time, the Collective Security Treaty Organization was added to these components, uniting the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Given the full-scale war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine, the consideration of this component has lost its relevance. The intensification of complex cross-sectoral and transboundary security threats requires expanding cooperation to ensure security development at all levels. The spread of crisis phenomena (terrorist acts, the development of criminal networks, pandemics, etc.) has become an indicator of the stability of the existing security infrastructure and the effectiveness of crisis management systems.

The EU Security Union Strategy for the period 2020–2025 (European Commission, 2020) envisages strengthening the interconnection between internal and external security. With the adoption of the Security Union Strategy, four strategic priorities have been identified at the level of the entire integrated association:

- a secure environment ensuring the future, which includes protecting and enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure (both physical and digital) through the activation of public-private partnerships and international

- cooperation to strengthen cybersecurity;
- combatting evolving threats, involving the use of artificial intelligence and database work. Key measures envisage countering hybrid threats that weaken social cohesion through early monitoring, analysis, timely information dissemination, etc.;
 - protecting Europeans from terrorism and organized crime, involving overcoming discrimination and radicalization in society, developing the judicial system, and developing programs to combat organized crime, criminal networks, drug trafficking, human trafficking, firearms smuggling, etc.;
 - a strong European security ecosystem, where governments, law enforcement agencies, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens share joint responsibility for shaping and ensuring security. Important tools for countering threats and minimizing risks include research and innovation; accordingly, the establishment of the EU Innovation Hub for Internal Security and the further development of cooperation with EU international partners are envisaged.

Conflicts and crises unfold in a very complex manner, and are usually unpredictable. Russia has become a catalyst for war on the European continent, endangering the European security system. The attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a paradigm shift in the EU's thinking about peace and security (European Union, 2022). In 2022, there was an update to the strategic documents of the EU (European Union, 2023) and NATO (2022b).

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and against the backdrop of heightened modern geopolitical risks and complex security threats, the countries of the EU adopted a new strategic document in March 2022 – the Strategic Compass (A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. For a European Union that protects its citizens, values, and interests and contributes to international peace and security; European Union, 2023). This substantiates the strengthening of the strategic autonomy of the integration association, which acts as an active global player. The program document presents a coordinated common strategic vision

of the EU's role in security and defense for the medium term, including: the assessment of the current strategic environment and threats and challenges to the EU; a coordinated common vision of actions in the field of security and defense; the identification of new ways and means to strengthen the collective security system; and the definition of clear directions for implementation and priority actions. The Strategic Compass aims to further strengthen the EU's role in crisis resolution using various instruments, particularly emphasizing the role of strategic partnership with NATO to ensure Euro-Atlantic security and protect the global order as a whole. Similarly, the importance and uniqueness of the EU as a NATO partner are underscored in the updated NATO Strategic Concept document (NATO, 2022a). NATO allies and EU members share common values and play complementary and coordinated roles in supporting peace, international order, and security. Non-EU Alliance members are also involved in EU defense efforts. The main goal of the NATO Strategic Concept, which was also adopted in the context of the war in Ukraine, is to ensure collective defense of its members based on a 360-degree approach. The main components of the new strategic document are defined as: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and security based on cooperation.

According to the Joint EU-NATO Declaration (NATO, 2023), among the key issues requiring joint and coordinated solutions are strengthening geostrategic competition, ensuring resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure, the proliferation of new and revolutionary technologies, space, the consequences of climate change, information manipulation and interference, etc. It should be emphasized that differences in the national policies of NATO member countries that are not EU members complicate the optimal and timely resolution of individual issues (ambivalence on specific issues, different priorities, etc.) and directly affect the development of the EU-NATO partnership, which does not meet the requirements of the current strategic landscape. The agreement on mutual issues will,

on the one hand, contribute to strengthening the defense agenda of the Atlantic Alliance and the security development of EU countries.

Analyzing the adopted documents – the Strategic Compass and the Strategic Concept – allows us to identify the main areas of EU-NATO strategic partnership and determine Ukraine’s place in the system of priority actions of the EU and NATO (Table 1).

Table 1. Directions and priority actions of the EU Strategic Compass and the NATO Strategic Concept

Source: compiled based on European Union (2023); NATO (2022a)

The EU Strategic Compass		The NATO Strategic Concept	
Direction	Priority actions	Priority actions	Direction

Action	<p>Establishment of a powerful rapid response capability for various types of crises (up to 5,000 military personnel).</p> <p>Conducting regular combat exercises, enhancing military mobility.</p> <p>Enhancement of EU missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy.</p> <p>Ensuring an operational and flexible decision-making mechanism.</p>	<p>Combination of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.</p> <p>Increasing global awareness, enhancing collective readiness for rapid response.</p> <p>Ensuring continuous presence on land, at sea, and in the air, countering terrorism.</p> <p>Development of effective crisis management tools.</p> <p>Counteracting hybrid operations and other hybrid tactics of states and non-state actors.</p>	Containment and defense
Security	<p>Utilization of a hybrid toolkit and reaction force.</p> <p>Application of cybersecurity policy tools.</p> <p>Countering information manipulation and interference.</p> <p>EU's space strategy in the field of security and defense.</p> <p>Coordinated maritime presence.</p>	<p>Accelerating digital transformation, improving cyber defense.</p> <p>Supporting the safe use of and unhindered access to space and cyberspace.</p> <p>Containment and protection against all threats at sea.</p> <p>NATO's nuclear capability for the preservation of peace and the prevention and deterrence of aggression.</p>	
Investment	<p>Enhancing technological and industrial defense capabilities.</p> <p>Developing technological defense innovations to reduce strategic dependencies.</p> <p>Increasing defense expenditures.</p>	<p>Reducing strategic vulnerability and dependence.</p>	Security based on cooperation
Partnership	<p>Strengthening the strategic partnership with NATO and the UN.</p> <p>Cooperation with regional partners (OSCE, African Union, ASEAN).</p> <p>Continued support for Ukraine and its people jointly with international partners.</p> <p>Activation of bilateral partnerships.</p> <p>Military assistance to partners through the European Peace Fund.</p>	<p>Coordinated increase in defense spending.</p> <p>The EU – an important and unique partner of NATO.</p> <p>Expansion of NATO for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.</p> <p>Practical support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.</p> <p>Investment in crisis response systems, support for civilian crisis management and operations, strengthening support for NATO partners.</p> <p>Increased assistance in building capacity for vulnerable partners.</p>	

The main areas of strategic partnership between the EU and NATO include:

- security and defense;
- countering hybrid threats through the coordinated and balanced deployment of rapid response forces, including the use of cyber tools;
- the protection of critical infrastructure, involving both state and private actors;
- innovation and investment in new defense and civilian technologies, including the application of artificial intelligence;
- “green” defense through the promotion of energy-efficient technologies

and addressing risks associated with climate change, among other factors.

The alignment of the main spheres of strategic partnership between the EU and NATO essentially defines the unity and coordination of actions aimed at countering and preventing crises and threats, including hybrid threats, to strengthen the architecture of European security and the international order as a whole. It is important for both the EU and NATO to develop partnerships bilaterally, with regional and global institutions, to achieve security objectives. NATO and the EU play complementary, consistent, and mutually reinforcing roles in enhancing security in Europe and beyond, supporting global peace and security.

The strategic priorities of EU security development require an appropriate update of the format of relations (Grant, 2022) with relevant EU partners (countries and regions). Expanding cooperation between the EU and the UN, OSCE, and ASEAN, deepening bilateral partnerships with the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, and Japan, and implementing joint programs with African, Asian, and Latin American countries are of significant importance. After lengthy and sometimes painful negotiations regarding Brexit, joint assistance to Ukraine has strengthened the alignment between the UK and the EU based on shared fundamental interests such as ensuring peace, protecting democratic values, etc. The UK closely cooperated with the EU and the US to coordinate packages of sanctions against Russia. Given Russia's military aggression on the one hand and certain inconsistencies in decision-making among EU countries on the other, defining the main directions of policy towards Russia remains relevant. Among intra-regional issues, particular attention is required regarding the question of developing productive relations with the Western Balkans.

The war has increased defense spending worldwide. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2023), during the Cold War, NATO allies' defense spending typically averaged over 3% of GDP, with some significant variations. After the end of the Cold War, NATO countries significantly

reduced their defense spending. Over the period 2000-2022 total EU spending on defense increased by 20%, the US by 66%. In contrast, since 2000, Russian military spending has increased by 2.3 times, and Chinese spending has increased by 5.7 times. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, global military spending increased by 3.7% in real terms in 2022, reaching a new high of \$2.24 trillion. The bulk of spending (56%) is accounted for by three countries – the US, China, and Russia. Looking at Ukraine's level of military spending, as shown in Table 2, despite the highest increase in its entire history of observation in 2022, the absolute volume of military spending is at only half that of the aggressor country. It is quite evident that without international assistance, achieving victory for the Ukrainian people will be extremely difficult.

Table 2. Military spending of Ukraine and Russia in 2022

Source: compiled using SIPRI (2023)

Index	Ukraine	Russia
Growth of military spending, %	640	9.2
Volume of military spending, billion \$	44	86.4
Share of military spending in GDP (2022), %	34	4.1
Share of military spending in GDP (2021), %	3.2	3.7

The war on the European continent and the change in the international order have brought to the forefront the need for coordinated cooperation within the EU-NATO format (Brethous & Kovalčíková, 2023), which has a long history but requires a new level of partnership. There is an objective necessity to reconsider the EU's security, defense, and foreign policies, as well as to change its priorities on the continent and worldwide (NATO, 2023). The weakening of Russia's geopolitical position does not prevent threats from the aggressor country, including nuclear provocations. It is important to emphasize that both strategic documents of the EU and NATO affirm unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as support for the Ukrainian people jointly

with international partners, including through additional political, financial, humanitarian, and material-technical assistance, and practical support for its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

As a result of Russia's active military phase on Ukrainian territory and the corresponding reaction from the European community, issues of unanimity and consensus in making joint decisions have become more acute. The war has strengthened EU solidarity in foreign and security policy, but the conflict has also revealed discrepancies among Member States. Even amidst the war, some countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc.) are reluctant to take a hardline position on Russia, primarily due to their high level of energy dependence. Despite this, the EU has provided unprecedented humanitarian, political, financial, and military support to the Ukrainian people. As of May 2023 (European Commission, 2023b), extensive support had been provided to Ukraine and its people totaling over €70 billion, including €38 billion in economic assistance, €1.7 billion in humanitarian aid, and €15 billion in military support. EU countries have provided temporary protection to approximately 4 million people who have fled the country since the start of the war. Already amidst the war, Ukraine officially submitted its application for membership in the European Union on February 28, 2023, and on June 23, it was granted candidate status for EU membership.

The imposition of sanctions (11 packages as of July 2023) to restrict access to critical technologies and markets has significantly reduced the aggressor's ability to continue the war. Sanctions include diplomatic and visa restrictions and freezing assets against certain individuals and entities, including banks and financial institutions, companies in the military and defense sectors, the aviation, shipbuilding, and engineering industries, armed forces and militarized groups, as well as political parties and media disseminating disinformation. As of July 2023, sanctions apply to 1,551 individuals and 245 organizations responsible for undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine

(European Council, 2024), and 70% of assets in the Russian banking system are under sanctions. Economic sanctions include prohibiting SWIFT for certain Russian banks, restricting Russia's access to EU capital and financial markets, and banning transactions with the Russian central bank, with €300 billion of its reserves blocked. Approximately €20 billion of assets of individuals and organizations under sanction have been frozen, and mechanisms are being developed to use frozen assets to support Ukraine's reconstruction. In the transport sector, sanctions include closing EU airspace to all Russian aircraft, prohibiting Russian road transport operators and the maritime transport of Russian oil to third countries, and closing EU ports for Russian ship transport. Additionally, there is a ban on the export of goods and resources that could enhance Russia's industrial capabilities and on the import of goods that are strategically important for forming the aggressor country's economic potential (products of the mining and metallurgical industry, timber, synthetic rubber, plastics, etc.). An important component of economic sanctions is formed of restrictions in the energy sector, which are strategically important for the aggressor country's potential (banning the import of Russian oil and coal, prohibiting investments in energy, etc.). In terms of providing services to Russia or its citizens, there is a ban on architectural and engineering services, IT consulting, marketing research, opinion polling, legal consulting, and services related to intellectual property rights on commercial secrets. As a result, Russia's GDP contraction in 2022 was 2.1% (European Council, 2023), and the process continues. The total volume of damage, losses, and needs by sectors is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. The total amount of damage, losses, and needs by sectors in the Russian economy caused by sanctions (in billion \$)

Source: World Bank; Government of Ukraine; European Union; United Nations (2023)

Sector	Damage ¹	Losses ²	Needs ³
Social sector			
Housing	50.4	17.2	68.6

Education and science	4.4	0.8	10.7
Healthcare	20.5	16.5	16.4
Social protection and livelihoods	0.2	4.2	41.8
Culture and tourism	2.6	15.2	6.9
Infrastructure sectors			
Energy and mineral extraction	10.6	27.2	47.0
Transportation	35.7	31.6	92.1
Telecommunications and digital technologies	1.6	1.6	4.5
Water supply and sanitation	2.2	7.5	7.1
Municipal services	2.4	3.0	5.7
Production sectors			
Agriculture	8.7	31.5	29.7
Trade and industry	10.9	85.8	23.2
Irrigation and water resource management	0.4	0.3	8.9
Financial sector and banking	0	6.8	6.8
Cross-cutting sectors			
Environmental protection, natural resource management, and forestry	1.5	0.5	1.5
Emergency response and civil protection	0.2	0.5	1.5
Justice and public administration	0.3	1.4	0.6
Management of explosive hazards	-	37.6	37.6
Total	134.7	289.1	410.6

¹Damage – direct expenses associated with the complete or partial destruction of physical assets and infrastructure; they are determined in monetary terms, with an assessment of the costs of replacement or repair of physical assets and infrastructure, taking into account the replacement value determined prior to the war.

²Losses – changes in economic flows due to the war; they are determined in monetary terms, for example, increased operational costs, foregone revenues of government/private sector, etc.

³Reconstruction needs – the cost associated with returning to the normal pre-war state through the implementation of relevant measures, including repair and restoration and upgrades related to the “build back better” principle (such as enhanced energy efficiency, modernization efforts, and sustainable development standards), as well as factors such as global inflation, price increases due to construction volume, higher insurance costs, etc. Needs are expressed in monetary terms according to market prices as of February 24, 2023.

According to expert estimates from the World Bank (World Bank, 2023), the reconstruction and rebuilding needs of Ukraine over the 10 years from February 24, 2023, are estimated at \$411 billion. In 2023, immediate needs for the restoration of critical infrastructure such as energy, housing, social services, and others, ensuring basic services for the most vulnerable populations, humanitarian

demining, and support for the private sector amount to \$14 billion, which is nearly 3.5% of the total identified needs. The sectors most affected by combat actions are housing (38% of total incurred damage), transportation (26%), energy (8%), trade and industry (8%), and agriculture (6%).

To aid Ukraine, the European Commission has introduced a special 4-year program (2024–2027) called the Ukraine Facility (European Commission, 2023b), with a total budget of €50 billion. The program aims to financially support Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and modernization efforts in the context of its prospective EU membership and the transition to a green, digital, and inclusive economy. The main components of the program are as follows:

- Component I – financial support (in the form of grants and loans to the state), aimed at supporting the financial stability of Ukraine's public finances in line with the country's recovery, reconstruction, and modernization plan (structural reforms and investments, macro-financial stability, public governance reform, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, etc.);
- Component II – special investment program (providing guarantees and blended financing combining EU loans and grants), aimed at attracting and mobilizing public and private investments for the reconstruction needs of Ukraine;
- Component III – technical assistance directed towards supporting municipalities, civil society, etc.

This program will replace the existing support system received by Ukraine (under the Macro-financial Assistance program (MFA+, Macro-financial Assistance) and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument)) by introducing a unified, comprehensive, and flexible instrument with clear and transparent monitoring, audit, and control mechanisms on a project basis.

Support for reforms, reconstruction, and creating new conditions for economic

development in times of war in Ukraine, including the restoration of critically important infrastructure, is important from the perspective of generating revenues for the state budget, creating jobs, and returning forcibly displaced Ukrainians home. The post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is an important component of further progress towards Ukraine's membership in the EU and its integration into the European security complex.

Understanding the interdependence of the impact of hybrid threats on national economic security in the modern context of increasing geopolitical tension has led to a review of the strategic orientations for ensuring economic security. A comprehensive approach to the joint identification, assessment, and management of risks in the context of ensuring the economic security of the European Union has become the basis for the European Economic Security Strategy (European Commission, 2023a), discussions on which began in June 2023. Achieving economic security is envisaged through:

- ensuring high competitiveness of the union, the source of which is the strengthening of the Single Market, enhancing the scientific, technological, and industrial base;
- protection against risks (for supply chains, including energy security, critical infrastructure, including cybersecurity, risks related to technology leakage, technological security, dependencies, etc.), through both existing and new policies and instruments;
- the development of partnerships at various levels to address common problems and strengthen the international economic order regulated by multilateral mechanisms, while maintaining maximum levels of economic openness and dynamism.

Achieving a secure position requires the formation of an appropriate security complex, the development of which is based on expanding links between countries in addressing global conflicts and other issues related to global security initiatives. National governments actively employ a wide range of tools to ensure

economic growth and a corresponding level of competitiveness of their economies while ensuring national security.

If the level of national security is primarily determined by a state's ability to ensure the security of its citizens, then global security is determined by countries' inability to resolve global conflicts and problems independently. In fact, global security defines what is best for all (Osisanya, 2015). The needs for the secure development of one country cannot be met without considering the interests and needs of other countries, emphasizing once again the complexity of the hierarchical structure of the modern model of international economic security, where multilevel interdependent components have a complex structure of relationships.

By supporting Ukraine in its resistance to Russian military aggression, the EU will contribute to the development of the regional security complex by strengthening strategic partnership with NATO, which the EU sees as a unique and important partner. A stronger security complex will positively contribute to transatlantic and global security. The war has increased NATO's role in ensuring European security, and the gradual integration of EU and NATO tools will promote the more effective joint coordination of the two institutions in terms of resistance to and the identification and prevention of risks through the joint development of relevant strategic documents, the implementation of joint projects, etc. Strengthening the architecture of the European security complex against the backdrop of NATO's further expansion will enhance transatlantic and global security, among other things.

Given the current structure of the global economy, NATO acts as a transatlantic region that unites countries from different continents, characterized by political-institutional interaction. The Alliance, formed on the basis of defining common values and identity, with a complex system of institutional support, ensures the European regional security complex. A fundamental feature is the absence of permanent borders in this transatlantic region, as the process of accession of new

alliance members continues.

Unlike NATO, the EU is an integration union (megaregion) within the global economic structure, which has the highest level of cooperation coverage and depth among integrated countries and institutional support. The dimension of interaction between countries within the EU is determined by socio-economic and political-institutional characteristics. Assistance to Ukraine from the EU and NATO (military, financial-economic, humanitarian, political) is, firstly, an important component of ensuring European and Euro-Atlantic security, as enshrined in strategic documents of the EU and NATO. Secondly, it serves as confirmation of the indivisibility of the security interests of Ukraine, the EU, and NATO.

The intensification of international relations has significantly expanded the scope of the study of security objects, which during the Cold War was clearly defined and has transformed into a complex and multidimensional phenomenon in modern times (Ağır & Arman, 2014, p. 107). In the contemporary international system, the influence of each state is determined not only by its military strength, but also by other dimensions of its influence in the modern geopolitical space, including economic potential, the level of innovation and technological development, and diplomatic influence. Therefore, achieving and supporting a balance of power in the global economy is of particular relevance. The balance of power in the modern international system is defined by corresponding rules and norms characterized by the following principles (Kaplan, 2005):

- 1) prioritizing negotiations over conflict;
- 2) enhancing capabilities rather than engaging in direct confrontation;
- 3) preventing the exclusion of important actors;
- 4) resisting any coalition or individual actor seeking dominance in the system;
- 5) restraining entities subscribing to supranational organizational principles;
- 6) allowing defeated or marginalized major actors to reintegrate into the system.

In fact, any conflict will impact the development of the national economic

system. In the sphere of international trade, a trade conflict directly affects not only the realm of foreign trade security, but also national security as a whole.

An important role in shaping the global security system is played by international organizations, whose activities are aimed at harmonizing relations between countries, transforming the interests of each country into common (global) interests. Essentially, only through international cooperation is it possible to address problems that have taken on a transnational scale, arising from non-traditional threats that cause tension in society and have a multiplicative impact on it. To build a common architecture of global governance, two components are needed from the international community: engaging all stakeholders in sustainable dialogue, which will be crucial, and systemic thinking not constrained by short-term institutional and national considerations. Failure to adopt such a new approach would be a tragedy for humanity.

The contemporary industrialized world is moving towards a risk society, where wealth and wealth distribution are replaced by risk distribution. This entails the emergence of a new risky and unpredictable reality, in which identifying the nature of threats and risks and developing appropriate actions by the state are insufficient for the effective development of the national economic system. The significance of interstate interaction and cooperation to jointly counter risky consequences is increasing. Unfortunately, since the beginning of the 21st century, trust in the principles, conventions, and processes aimed at ensuring peace and stability in the world has gradually declined (Huisken, 2023, p. 4), leading to a reduction in the scope of negotiation processes alongside the escalation of tension in international relations and an increase in conflicts between democratic and authoritarian forms of governance. Accordingly, against the backdrop of heightened national interests of countries in the global economy, the security component of their sustainable development becomes paramount (Panchenko et al., 2021).

The complexity of the conflict related to ensuring international security is

exacerbated by challenges that directly affect national security (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023, pp. 4–5):

- firstly, competition among major powers, rising regional powers, and certain non-state actors for dominance in the global order to establish new rules that will define the international order (escalation of confrontation between the USA on one side and China and Russia on the other, against the backdrop of the war Russia has unleashed in Ukraine);
- secondly, the severe consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have deepened economic problems directly linked to energy and food security, which, along with other global challenges (climate change, human security) and the increased influence (both positive and negative) of modern digital technologies, amplify the uncertainty and vulnerability of the contemporary environment.

Empirical research on the development of the global economy in the second half of the 20th century has allowed for the differentiation of states based on their ability to counter external and internal threats. Strong countries are characterized by greater internal cohesion, while weaker states are more vulnerable to external threats due to existing internal challenges and developmental issues. Considering this, countries of the world can be classified into the following types (Buzan & Wæver, 2023, p. 41):

- superpowers, which include countries capable of realizing their potential (military, political, economic) throughout the international security system, thus belonging to special actors in international relations that operate at the systemic level;
- regional powers, which consist of countries with significant regional influence;
- island states, located in the zone of indifference between regional security complexes;
- buffer states, which largely depend on the existing security situation in neighboring countries and are located between relevant regional security complexes.

Regarding buffer states, it should be noted that they typically have geostrategic importance for actors from different regions. Ukraine, for instance, is one such state, characterized by its simultaneous presence at the intersection of two spaces – European and post-Soviet. Therefore, the national security issues of Ukraine are difficult to consider separately from the security issues of both regions. Serving as a buffer state, Ukraine has felt increasing pressure as it has constantly been under the influence of two divergent regional security complexes. Moreover, for a long time, uncertainty regarding the country's external economic and foreign policy course in addressing regional security issues has prevented effective resistance to the destructive consequences of such divergent pressure.

The resolution of contemporary problems that have acquired a transnational scale requires joint decisions, which should result from effective international cooperation ranging from bilateral and regional to global formats. Consequently, the formation of a global security system plays an important role for international and regional organizations, whose activities aim at transforming the interests of each country into common (global) interests. The escalation of risks in the development of the global economy transforms the contemporary policies of countries (trade, economic, foreign, migration, etc.), leading to changes in regulatory instruments aimed at safeguarding national interests. However, as today's reality shows, collective means of regulation have proven insufficient in addressing transnational issues and minimizing risks. Thus, there arises an objective need to define the hierarchy of levels and structural components of economic security in the context of the contemporary spatial structure of the global economy, which will contribute to the determination and achievement of strategic priorities for the secure development of national economies, taking into account the current processes of global regionalization and fragmentation.

On February 24, 2022, the principles of peaceful coexistence in the world were violated – namely, the fundamental norm of the international order prohibiting

the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Huisken, 2023, p. 4). The economic consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine could be decisive for the development of globalization processes in the 21st century, as the war has prompted a fundamental reassessment of economic relations and dependencies, fluctuations in value systems, and shifting alliances, creating a new global map of economic relations (Lagarde, 2022). Thus, the uncertainty and vulnerability of the contemporary global environment have not only heightened global challenges and intensified competition between states (global, regional), but also led to an open war on the European continent, directly impacting the security of national economies. In the context of global regionalization, new tasks are emerging to ensure the economic security of national economies, which are currently undergoing strategic reconsideration in light of military actions.

Conclusions

As globalization processes deepen and spread, certain security spheres emerge that states cannot regulate unilaterally. Due to increased interconnectedness and interdependence between countries in the context of globalization, the need for intergovernmental cooperation becomes even more pressing.

The course of events that has unfolded in the formation of the independent Ukrainian state since 1991 allows us to assert that the slowdown in Ukraine's accession to the European security system contributed to the escalation of aggression from Russia, culminating in military action. Undoubtedly, joining NATO, with which Ukraine has cooperated since 1992, required Ukraine to meet certain criteria. However, the policy of appeasement towards Russia by certain European countries played a significant role in the slow progress of Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result, their unwillingness to intervene in armed conflicts near Ukrainian borders (in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) further fueled Russia's imperial ambitions, which later culminated in a full-scale war against Ukraine and the

complete destruction of the international security system. The war harshly demonstrates that by remaining outside NATO and the EU for a long time, Ukraine essentially had no opportunity to be fully involved in the process of shaping and developing the common architecture of European security.

Russia's war against Ukraine has underscored the high degree of dependency in security matters. This has led to intensified discussions regarding European strategic autonomy in security issues. Events unfolding on the European continent, where the Ukrainian people are fighting for their independence and defending European values, demonstrate that ensuring Ukraine's economic security can only be achieved within the structure of the European security complex.

Post-war reconstruction in Ukraine is an important component of further progress towards Ukraine's membership in the EU and its integration into the European security complex. The instrument to support and practically implement this goal is the Ukraine Facility (2024–2027), focusing on Ukraine's transition to a green, digital, and inclusive economy. Effective work to ensure Ukraine's economic security is determined by the efficiency of the national security system, which is influenced by global transformations creating qualitatively new conditions for the security environment and becoming a source of challenges and threats to economic security, complicating the functioning of the national economic security system and increasing the importance of interstate cooperation in this direction. Remaining outside NATO and the EU for a long time, Ukraine has had no opportunity to be fully involved in the process of shaping and developing the joint architecture of European security. Accordingly, stable and strong neighborly relations, a secure environment, and the economic development of the state are the goals of Ukraine's participation in regional formats and initiatives, which the country actively develops to strengthen both national and regional security.

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