

MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY

Public Security Academy

TRANSFORMATIONS, CHALLENGES AND SECURITY

Collective monograph



Mykolas Romeris
universitetas

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CONTENT

CHAPTER I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL LABOR MARKET: GLOBALIZATION DISCOURSE.....	8
1.1. Global labor transformations and economic development.....	13
1.2. Migration trends in the global labor market.....	17
1.3. The global contours of the formation of migration policy.....	26
CHAPTER II. UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC SECURITY: CHANGES IN THE SE- CURITY POSITION AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES	68
2.1. Modern scientific and methodological approaches to monitoring the eco- nomic security of countries	68
2.2. Recent changes in Ukraine's security position.....	93
2.3. Ensuring the national economic security of Ukraine in the context of ma- jor global transformations	117
2.4. Strategic priorities in the development of Ukraine's security	149
Chapter III. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS OF UKRAINE AND EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES – CASE STUDIES	184
3.1. Environmental security in the national security system: Ukraine.....	184
3.2. The impact of economic security on economic growth in European Union countries.....	211
3.3. Strategies for implementing digital technologies in circular economy mo- dels: balancing economic security and sustainable industrial growth.....	231
3.4. The right to education – is it achievable in the modern age of technology in the context of pandemics and armed conflict?.....	251
3.5. The early diagnosis of catastrophic events: weak signal detection based on information field monitoring	289
3.6. The transformation of business processes in industrial enterprises under the conditions of digitalization	316

Chapter IV. THE IMPACT OF HYBRID THREATS	331
4.1. The search for the definition of hybrid threats.....	335
4.2. Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare.....	340
4.3. The response of international law– the prohibition of the use of force and hybrid warfare	342
4.4 Hybrid warfare and laws of war	347
CHAPTER V. THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICY	356
5.1. Terrorism as a threat to international and national security	357
5.2. The problem and significance of defining terrorism	358
5.3. The definition of terrorism in international law: the universal level.....	360
5.4. Regional definitions of terrorism	365
CHAPTER VI. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY ON BUSINESS.	376
6.1. The emergence of economic security.....	379
6.2. Theories of economic security.....	386
6.3. The concept of economic security in Lithuania	394
6.4. The objects of economic security	398
6.5. Theories of state regulation of the economy	415
6.6. Legal aspects of doing business in Lithuania	431
6.7. Direct and indirect threats to the security environment.....	461
CHAPTER VII. FEATURES OF RISK PERCEPTION IN THE TOURISM SECTOR.....	487
7.1. Risk classification and specific features of the tourism sector	488
7.2. Models for the economic evaluation of tourism risk.....	510
7.2.1. Models for assessing business risk	510
7.2.2 Tourism risk assessment models.....	534
7.2.3. Methodological principles for risk assessment in the tourism sector	539

CHAPTER VIII. ECONOMIC SECURITY AND TOURISM RISK MANAGEMENT	558
8.1. Levels of tourism-related economic security	560
8.2. The development of the tourism sector	567
8.3. Expert risk assessments of the inbound tourism complex.....	596
8.4. Tourism complex risk management.....	608
CHAPTER IX. THE REGULATION OF NON-HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ECONOMIC SECURITY	619
9.1. Non-horizontal concentrations and economic security	622
9.1.1. The concept of non-horizontal concentrations.....	622
9.1.2. Economic security and concentration policy	629
9.1.3. The assessment of non-horizontal concentrations	665
9.2. Action: concentration.....	670
9.2.1. Concentration due to the merger of undertakings	671
9.2.2. Concentration due to acquisition of control	676
9.2.3. “Decisive influence” and control.....	683
9.2.4. Long-lasting change.....	702
9.3. Harm: detrimental effect on competition.....	704
9.3.1. Market foreclosure due to vertical concentration	709
9.3.2. Leveraging into another market.....	721
9.3.3. Increased market power	731
9.3.4. Access to competitively sensitive information	736
9.3.5. Easier coordination with competitors	738
9.3.6. Harm vs. benefits to competition.....	741
9.3.7. The market and power therein	751
9.4. Chains of cause and effect	766
9.4.1. Causality issues	766
9.4.2. The merger of a failing undertaking.....	771

CHAPTER I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL LABOR MARKET: GLOBALIZATION DISCOURSE

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Abstract. *The aim of this study is to identify the most recent transformations in the global labor market in the context of the globalization of the labor supply system.*

Research tasks:

- to investigate global labor resource transformations and economic development;*
- to analyze migration trends in the global labor market system;*
- to determine the prerequisites for the formation of a global migration policy outline.*

The influence of globalization on the development of the global labor market is studied. It is established that the dynamics of the international labor market have a complex socio-economic nature and are determined by the state of labor resources, the development of national labor markets, and the nature of the distribution and

redistribution of labor in the global economy.

A conclusion regarding future labor resource threats in the global labor market system is formed on the basis of the analysis of the global demographic situation. Manifestations of global labor resource crises are identified, determined by: the features of the development of employment in the global economy; the transformation of employment due to the influence of technological change; and the global gap in the level of employment. It is determined that international migration is a key factor in the transformation of the global labor market.

At the present stage of economic development, international migration is an objective requirement for the formation of an integrated global economic system. Manifestations of international migration are driven by both the needs of global development in general and factors of the internal economic development of some countries in particular. In modern conditions, migration is not only a factor and component of the globalization process, but also a means of solving economic problems.

It is determined that in recent decades, stable trends have emerged in the distribution of migration flows between countries. Economically developed countries dominate among migrant destinations. The labor shortage in these countries is a consequence of the so-called “demographic transition”: it requires significant compensatory immigration to maintain the size of the economically active population. The result is the intensification of international labor migration. As a consequence, the redistribution of labor resources on a global scale is observed.

This chapter concludes by suggesting that the primary features of international migration are reflections of socio-economic transformations around the world. The manifestations and dynamic trends of these changes should be taken into account when developing state migration policy in any country.

Keywords: global labor market, globalization of labor supply, global labor resource transformations, employment, international migration, migration policy.

Current global economic development is characterized by systemic transformations in the context of the integrity of the global economy. Under these conditions, the labor resource factor turns into a determining component of economic development that causes transformational changes in the global labor resource provision system.

Global labor resource transformations make it necessary to analyze trends in the development of the global labor market, taking into account the role of migration in the system of international labor communications in order to determine optimal ways of creating a system for the international division of labor.

1.1. Global labor transformations and economic development

The activation of globalization processes radically changes the mechanism of labor supply at all levels and expands the spatial field involved in solving the problem of labor supply, which goes beyond the geographical borders of countries.

The basic condition of labor supply in the global economy lies in the nature of demographic development. From 1950 to 2100, the continuation of a positive trend is expected in the size of the global population (with some decreases expected after 2085). It is projected that there will be 8.5 billion people in the world by 2030, 9.7 billion by 2050, and 10.3 billion by 2100 (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. The dynamics of the global population from 1950 to 2100, million people

***2025–2100 – forecast**

Source: PopulationPyramid.net (n.d.)

At the same time, as the total population grows, differences in global demographic trends increase depending on countries' levels of economic development (Fig. 2). From 1960 to 2020, the population in high-income economies increased by 1.6 times (from 0.78 to 1.24 billion people), in upper-middle income economies it increased by 2.3 times (from 1.20 to 2.77 billion people), in lower-middle income economies it increased by 3.4 times (from 0.91 to 3.12 billion people), and in low-income economies it increased by 4.8 times (from 0.14 to 0.67 billion people) (World Bank, 2023b).¹




Figure 2. The structural dynamics of the global population by country income level, 1960–2020, billion people

Source: World Bank (2023b)

Over the next 30 years, half of the world's population growth will occur in 9 countries: India, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States, Uganda, and Indonesia. The most heavily populated countries in the world are China (1.4 billion people) and India (1.3 billion), and India is expected to overtake China in terms of population by 2024–2026. At

¹ Here and further the classification of countries by income level is provided by the World Bank Country and Lending Groups <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>

the same time, the country with the highest population growth rate is Nigeria, which will become the third most populous country in the world and overtake the United States in this regard by 2050 (Balabaniuk, 2020).

In addition, due to increases in life expectancy, the number of elderly people in the world will increase significantly. It is expected that the number of people aged over 80 years will increase six-fold from 2020 to 2100, from 146 million people to 881 million, while the average global age will increase from 31 to 42 years. Accordingly, the structure of the working-age population will change significantly, which will require the formation of a new paradigm of labor supply for the global economy.

From a regional perspective, the situation is significantly differentiated (Fig. 3): in each region, the demographic policy and the birth rate were formed as components of the general political, economic, and social history of the region's countries.




Figure 3. Population dynamics by global region in 1950–2100

***2023–2100 – forecast**

Source: PopulationPyramid.net (n.d.)

As a result of the Asian demographic transition (a decrease in mortality while maintaining a high birth rate), for example, the characteristic feature of the demographic situation in Asia in the second half of the last century is the demographic

explosion, which led to the strengthening of institutional birth control.

Demographic shifts in Europe are based on changes in Europeans' demographic behavior and an increase in the employment rate of women (Northern, Southern and Western Europe: 1995 – 39.7%; 2000 – 42.5%; 2005 – 44.6%; 2010 – 45.7%; 2015 – 46.3%; 2018 – 47.7%; 2021 – 49.1%). In Europe, an important role is played by measures aimed at achieving gender equality and equalizing professional and parental roles, as well as supporting single parents.

These measures are part of the second demographic transition in Europe, the leading feature of which is the sanctity of individuals: special importance is given to self-development, self-expression, and free choice of lifestyle. Characteristic features of the second demographic transition are a well-developed welfare state, which requires a high level of economic development to ensure social needs, and a positive migration balance, because today the birth rate in Europe does not ensure the reproduction of the population, so it's below replacement rate.

Until 1975, the demographic development of North America was similar to the situation in Europe. Starting from 1980, the birth rate on the continent gradually increased, and by 2000 it reached the replacement level. In the USA, the total birth rate varies between 2–2.1, in contrast to Europe, where it is 1.6–1.7. The US population is expected to grow by almost 1.5 times by 2050, due to both natural increases and migration growth.

The demographic situation in Latin America is influenced by significant property inequality, which leads to so-called social exclusion (low educational level, lack of necessary professional qualifications, low wages, poverty) and causes powerful flows of unskilled migrants from the region (ADASTRA, 2021).

The demographic situation in Africa is quite specific, as a result of significant differences in the levels of economic development of the continent's countries. African countries demonstrate a special version of the demographic transition, according to which a country can simultaneously be in two stages which do not

necessarily have to follow one another (e.g., a declining birth rate and increasing life expectancy). At the same time, despite high mortality in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), the region's population doubles every 30 years.

Regarding Ukraine, existing and projected demographic trends (1990 – 51.6 million people, 2000 – 48.8 million, 2010 – 45.7 million, 2020 – 43.9 million, 2030 – 38.3 million, 2040 – 35.7 million, 2050 – 33.2 million, 2100 – 20.6 million people; Fig. 4) testify to future labor resource threats, which have been intensified by the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation (downward demographic trends in the pre-war period are added to flows of refugees abroad, the size of which as of the beginning of 2023 was estimated at 6.7 million people; Kalashnyk, 2023).




Figure 4. Dynamics of the population of Ukraine in 1950 –2100

***2023–2100 – forecast**

Source: *PopulationPyramid.net (n.d.)*

Despite a significant decrease in the population in 2022–2023 due to population outflow because of the war (2021 – 43.5 million people, 2022 – 39.7 million, 2023 – 36.7 million), a return to previous demographic trends is expected in the coming years (2024–2026) (Fig. 5). This is a phenomenon that requires further research, highlighting that the issue of regulating the demographic situation lies

within in the area of general economic processes in the state.




Figure 5. Dynamics of the population of Ukraine in 2000–2050

***2023–2050 – forecast**

Source: PopulationPyramid.net (n.d.)

According to estimates, in the medium and long term, the working-age share of the population in Ukraine is expected to decrease. According to positive or negative forecasts, by the beginning of 2060 this share may be between 47.7% and 55.3%. The specific weight of people older than working age may range from 24.7% to 40.8% (Pozniak & Shevchuk, 2014, p. 81). Taking into account the aforementioned, it is possible to form a conclusion regarding the expected growth of the demographic-economic load: there will be 600–633 people of retirement age per 1,000 people of working age at the beginning of 2060. One can also foresee the corresponding narrowing of the working-age population share to 47.7–55.3% (Pozniak & Shevchuk, 2014, p. 83), which actualizes the need to increase labor productivity in the country's economy. The importance of solving this issue is growing in the context of providing labor resources for post-war recovery and the further economic development of Ukraine.

It is obvious that global labor resource transformations affect the state of the international labor market, the importance of which is growing due to the issue of labor supply beyond national borders.

One characteristic of these transformations is that despite the growth of the workforce in the global economy (from 2.3 billion people in 1991 to 3.6 billion in 2023; Fig. 6), the level of employment exhibits a steady downward trend (from 61.4% in 1991 to 57.8% in 2023; Fig. 7).




Figure 6. Dynamics of the workforce (15–65 years old) in the global economy in 1991–2023, billion people

Source: World Bank (2023a)




Figure 7. Level of employment in the global economy in 1991–2023, %

Source: World Bank (2023a)

A rise in the unemployment rate is quite expected under these conditions, but existing trends do not confirm this hypothesis: the overall unemployment rate in the global labor market shows only minor fluctuations, and a downward trend can be observed from 2003 (Fig. 8). The only exception to this is the COVID-19 pandemic of 2021. It is also obvious that migration is causing the redistribution

of workers on the global labor market – that is, labor migration is intensifying.




Figure 8. The level of unemployment in the global economy in 1991–2023, %

Source: World Bank (2023a)

It should be noted that before 2020, all forecasts regarding the development of the labor market were based on the postulates of the fourth technological revolution. However, the development of technologies after 2020 led to the emergence of new trends and challenges, which significantly affected the prospects for the development of the labor market on a global scale.

Despite the difficulty of quantifying the impact of technological progress on human labor, the fact remains that this trend does not depend on countries' levels of economic development, as it is characteristic of all countries (Fig. 9).




Figure 9. Estimates of the percentage of jobs that may be lost as a result of automation (minimum and maximum estimate) for a number of countries, %.

Source: World Bank (2019, p. 22)

According to Oxford University estimates, of the 70 specialties contained in the O'NET database of the US Department of Labor, almost 50% are at risk of automation (some inaccuracies in these estimates are possible due to the likely mismatch of occupational categories used in different countries). In addition, the reduction of jobs in outdated industries is accompanied by their creation in high-tech areas (Gregory et al., 2019). For example, according to the estimates of the World Economic Forum, the loss of 75 million jobs was expected by 2022 as a result of automation in the world economy, with the creation of 133 million new roles ("Technology will create more jobs..." 2018) – that is, new technologies create more jobs than they displace.

It is possible to single out several main trends in the transformation of the labor market under the influence of technical and technological changes.

Firstly, new technologies lead to the creation of global digital companies that generate value by creating a network effect that connects customers, manufacturers, and suppliers, and also simplifies their interaction.

Secondly, new technologies form the newest set of skills necessary for work: in addition to professional training, the importance of cognitive skills (complex problem solving), social-behavioral skills (teamwork), and the ability to adapt (logical thinking, self-confidence) is increasing in the labor market. According to World Bank estimates, the share of workers in specialties that require cognitive and social-psychological skills not related to the performance of routine operations increased from 19% to 23% in developing countries from 2001 to 2019, while in developed countries it increased from 33% to 41% (World Bank, 2019, p. 24).

Thirdly, new technologies affect the strengthening of inequality between countries. In conditions of inequality between the opportunities available for professional self-realization or a mismatch of jobs with available skills, prerequisites are created for international labor migration (World Bank, 2019, pp. 5–9).

Developed countries dominate the process of technological transformation. This significantly affects the transformation of the employment structure, bringing the service sector into a dominant position (Fig. 10) and setting trends in the structural transformations of the global economy.




Figure 10. Dynamics of the structure of employment by spheres of economic activity and groups of countries by income level, 2013–2021, %

Source: World Bank (2023b)

Today, the growth of the service sector is among the most dynamic in the global economy. Services cover around two thirds of economic activity, and more than 50% of the world’s workforce is employed in service companies. In many countries, the contribution of the service sector to GDP ranges from 50% to 70%, and over the last decade international trade in commercial services has grown annually by 5.5%. The development of global exports of computer and information services has been particularly dynamic (10% per year), while the R&D sphere (9% per year) and royalties and license payments (6% per year) have also grown at a fairly high rate.

Companies with a higher share of highly educated employees more successfully generate innovations and compete on the international market, while employees with more significant human capital receive more substantial economic

benefits from new technologies. Thus, at different levels of the economy there is a positive correlation between the state of human capital and the extent to which new technologies have been introduced (World Bank, 2019, p. 12). That is why making investments in human capital is a condition for using the opportunities that open up with the use of new technologies. Thus, continuous training is an objective prerequisite for balancing the labor market.

In order to achieve the best economic results, the most valuable resource is a labor force of productive age. At the same time, the global unemployment rate among young people aged 15–24 remains high (Fig. 11).




Figure 11. Unemployment rate in the global economy among youth aged 15–24 in 1991–2023, %

Source: World Bank (2023a)

Two groups of factors influence the formation of the inactive segment of the youth population: *external* (economic and political uncertainty in the country, lack of decent work for young people without professional experience, lack of social elevators) and *internal* (low motivation to work, overestimated self-esteem, desire for quick results). These factors intersect at the point of self-actualization (self-actualization is connected with the availability of interesting work and is possible only under favorable socio-historical conditions; Azmuk, 2016, p. 15). The absence of appropriate external conditions alongside the presence of a desire

for self-actualization contributes to the activation of the migration factor in the global labor supply system: labor migration expands the range of possible individual life strategies which are aimed at adaptation to socio-economic realities.

Against the backdrop of growing differences in global well-being (Table 1) and aging populations in developed countries, the solution to the issue of labor supply will directly depend on migration. This confirms the experience of the permanent immigration countries (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), whose economic development strategies are based on the attraction of highly qualified immigrants as the basis of economic growth. Germany and France also belong to the group of developed countries with similar approaches to solving the labor supply problem.

As a result, the task of the international labor market concerning regulation in the context of migration arises, the starting conditions of which can be defined as follows:

- taking into account the openness of the labor market to foreign labor and the availability of mechanisms for recognizing professional skills and qualifications;
- understanding that managed labor migration has a positive effect on both countries of origin and countries of destination by accelerating economic development;
- the need for labor migration, which is supported by the improvement of national labor legislation and social protection systems;`
- the need to organize dialogue on labor migration issues at the intergovernmental level (Vnuchko, 2014).

Table 1. Dynamics of GDP per capita in different groups of countries in the 1000–2030 period, (PPT 1990* USD)

<i>Countries and their groups</i>	<i>Year</i>								
	<i>1000</i>	<i>1500</i>	<i>1820</i>	<i>1870</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2030*</i>
Western Europe	400	771	1,204	1,960	3,458	4,579	11,416	19,256	30,503
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	400	400	1,202	2,419	5,233	9,268	16,179	26,943	43,109
Japan	425	500	669	737	1,387	1,921	11,434	20,683	32,774
Western countries	405	702	1,109	1,882	3,672	5,649	13,082	22,509	35,932
Asia (excluding Japan)	405	572	577	550	658	634	1,226	3,256	...
Latin America	400	416	692	681	1,481	2,506	4,504	5,811	8,949
Eastern Europe and the former USSR	400	498	686	941	1,558	2,602	5,731	5,038	10,920
Africa	425	414	420	500	637	894	1,410	1,489	1,987
<i>The rest of the world</i>	441	538	578	606	860	1,091	2,072	3,372	8,304
<i>The world as a whole</i>	436	566	667	875	1,525	2,111	4,091	6,049	11,689
Interregional gap	1.1:1	1.9:1	2.9:1	4.8:1	8.2:1	14.6:1	13.2:1	18.1:1	...

Source: Lukianenko et al. (2013, p. 228)

* 2030 forecast

At the same time, the key requirement of the abovementioned regulation is the determination of the prospective needs of the labor market, taking into account the unification of requirements regarding the quality characteristics of the workforce in the conditions of the globalization of labor supply.

The importance of such regulation at the national and supranational level is determined by the need to mitigate the negative consequences and strengthen the positive effects that each country receives as a result of labor migration. Thus, it is necessary to consider the effects of both economic and non-economic factors: the

degree of the country's integration into the global economy; structural features of national labor markets; the characteristics of the demographic situation and the professional and qualification characteristics of the workforce, etc.

Taking into account differences in the levels of countries' economic development, the size of economic potential, specific conditions of economic activity, and the content of the national employment policy, it is obvious that the content of labor market regulation policies in different countries is not identical. At the same time, the central element of this new labor supply paradigm of the global economy is that it approaches the unification of the regulation of labor markets at the national level, which should be based on the ILO Global Pact on Jobs. This concerns promoting effective employment, regulating the labor sphere in accordance with international standards for the development of labor relations, developing tripartite cooperation, and social dialogue.

1.2. Migration trends in the global labor market

At the current stage of global development, the phenomenon of international migration continues to increase in scale, acting as a defining manifestation of the globalization process.

The foundational component of the formation of international migration flows is the state and nature of the development of the demographic situation – as the population grows, significant differences emerge in the course of demographic processes depending on the level of countries' economic development.

Against the backdrop of the increase in the global population over the last 60 years, there is a positive trend in international migration values. In 2020, almost 281 million people lived in a country other than their country of birth (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020; Migration Data Portal, n.d.; Fig. 12). This is approximately 128 million more people than in 1990 (152 million), and almost four times more than in 1960 (72 million).




Figure 12. Dynamics of migrants by income levels of destination countries in 1990–2020, million people²
Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Motivation is the determining factor in the formation of international migration flows, and is composed of the following sub-elements: economic system (search for better opportunities to realize the ability to work), security (evacuation, repatriation, etc.), political (political persecution, discrimination), social (marriage, recreation, etc.), environmental motives (ecological disasters, unsatisfactory state of the environment, etc.), and force majeure circumstances.

The distribution of migrants by destination in terms of country income level indicates a steady increase in migrants flows to high-income economies (from 77.80 million people in 1990 to 175.81 million people in 2020; Fig. 12), while maintaining a stable number of migrants to other groups of countries.

More revealing is the change in the distribution of migrants by specific destination country (Fig. 13). For the period from 1990 to 2020, the share of high-income economy destinations increased from 51% to 64%. At the same time, the share of lower-middle economy destinations decreased from 21% to 11%. Taking into account the increase in the global population, these changes are quite significant: 77.8 million people migrated to high-income economies in 1990, and 175.8 million people in 2020; 33.3 million people migrated to upper-middle economies

² Hereinafter, “migrant” is used to refer to an international migrant.

in 1990, and 54.3 million people in 2020; and 9.8 million people migrated to lower-income economies in 1990, and 13.1 million people in 2020. A decrease in the number of migrants is observed only in low-income economies – 31.9 million people in 1990 and 29.5 million people in 2020.




Figure 13. The distribution of migrants by destination country income level, 1990 and 2020, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

The shares of upper-income economies and low-income economies remain largely unchanged during the specified period: 21% and 20%, and 6% and 5%, respectively.

As can be seen, migrants are represented in countries with all income levels, but the reasons for migration are different, and the countries of the Persian Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council) stand out in particular (Fig. 14).




Figure 14. The structure of global migrants by host countries and reasons for migration in 2022, %

Source: McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (2021, p. 44)

* Gulf Cooperation Council countries are not included in other country groups in the chart

In order to highlight the factors that affect the transformation of the structural landscape of international migration movements, the situation in specified groups of countries requires more detailed analysis.

High-income OECD countries

The approximately 74 million migrants and refugees living in this group of countries (Fig. 15) consist of both high- and low-skilled workers, migrants with student visas, and stateless migrants.




Figure 15. Dynamics of migrants to OECD countries (countries with the largest influx of migrants are listed), 1990–2020, million people

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

A significant share of regular migrants are motivated by family reunification (with spouses, parents, or children), and around 35% of these migrants live in the European Union (EU). Among migrants in OECD countries are those who have full rights of residence (for example, 11 million EU citizens living in another EU country and 13.6 million Green Card holders in the United States). Some migrants move to OECD countries temporarily, others intend to stay – in OECD countries, there are around 62 million naturalized citizens who are not considered migrants and are not counted in statistics. Among migrants in this group of countries, around 10 million refugees also receive international protection.

The overall dynamics of the influx of migrants to OECD countries shows a significant increase over the past 30 years – from 65.6 million in 1990 to 144.2 million in 2020.

In 2022, migration flows to OECD countries reached record levels. In particular, permanent immigration has been at its highest point over the last 17 years: every third country recorded an inflow of migrants, including France (301,000), Spain (471,000), and Belgium (122,000), while absolute records were broken in the United Kingdom (521,000) and Canada (437,000).

In particular, two million asylum applications were submitted in OECD countries in 2022, which is the highest level in history and twice as many as in 2021. At the same time, almost 80% of immigrants belonged to the economically active category, of which 70% were working people (Ukrinform, 2023).

In total, the group of high-income countries hosts more than 175 million migrants (as of 2020, according to United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs data (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020). The vast majority of migrants come from China, India, and Mexico (Fig. 16).




Figure 16. Leading countries of origin for migrants in high-income countries, 1990–2020, million people

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Low- and middle-income economies

Approximately 79 million migrants (among them around 27 million refugees) that live in of low- and middle-income economies migrated for employment, family reunification, or other reasons, including those without citizenship (detailed data are not available for most countries in this group). Although migrants represent a relatively small proportion of the population in most low- and middle-income economies, there are some exceptions (Côte d'Ivoire – 9.5%, Djibouti – 12.6%, Gabon – 16%, Jordan – 41%, Lebanon – 34%; World Bank, 2023).

If we analyze the flows of migrants to middle-income and low-income economies, both the volume of migration flows and the countries of origin differ. Thus, middle-income economies are more attractive to migrants than low-income economies (82 million and 13 million migrants respectively, according to 2020

data).

There are also differences in migrants' countries of origin. People from middle-income economies mostly migrate to middle-income economies (russian federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Palestine, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Belarus, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan), and only 2 countries from the group of low-income economies (Syria and Afghanistan) are among the leaders in this regard. A similar situation is evident in low-income economies: low-income countries predominate among the countries of origin of migrants (Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi), and middle-income economies account for a much smaller share (Palestine, russian federation and India).

Member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia)

Of the approximately 31 million migrants (Fig. 17) living in the Persian Gulf countries, almost all have temporary status – usually a multi-year work visa with the right to extend. Of the entire pool of migrants (both high-skilled and low-skilled), only highly skilled migrants can be accompanied by their families. These countries do not accept large numbers of refugees. In general, migrants make up more than half of the population of the Persian Gulf countries – around 79% (excluding Saudi Arabia). Migration to the Persian Gulf countries is exclusively labor-based, but there are differences in levels of qualifications which affect the duration of migrants' visas and the possibility of inviting family.




Figure 17. Dynamics of migrants to the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1990–2020, million people

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

The increase in the flow of migrants to the Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia) is mostly caused by the increase of migration flows from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Although almost all migration to the region can be characterized as labor migration, its structure in the Persian Gulf countries is different: this mainly involves highly qualified personnel with an appropriate level of education from India, and low-skilled workers from Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Most of the countries in the specified groups are both countries of origin and countries of destination for migrants. For example, among high-income economies, the United Kingdom has become the host country for approximately 3.5 million immigrants, and at the same time was the country of origin for 4.7 million emigrants in 2022. Among middle-income economies, Turkey has a large economic migrant diaspora in Europe (1.9 million) out of a total of 3.5 million emigrants from the country, and at the same time hosts 3.4 million Syrian refugees and more than 2 million other migrants. Among low-income economies,

Nigeria is the host country for almost 1.3 million immigrants, and at the same time the country of origin for 1.7 million emigrants (Fleck, 2023).

It is characteristic that against the backdrop of global migration having grown by almost 4 times from 1960 to 2020 (from 72 to 281 million people; Fig. 12), the change in the share of migrants in the overall population structure has been insignificant: the share of persons born abroad (both migrants and naturalized citizens) grew from 2.4% of the global population in 1960 to 3.5% in 2020 (Fig. 18).




Figure 18. The share of international migrants in the total global population, 1960–2020, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

However, it should be taken into account that significant unevenness in demographic growth rates was observed in the second half of the 20th century: the global population grew by 156% between 1960 and 2020, while the population of high-income economies grew by only 58%, the population of middle-income economies increased by 177%, and the population of low-income economies grew by 383%. As a result, migration trends differ significantly between groups of countries. Thus, the share of emigrants in the total population of low-income economies has almost doubled since 1960 (Fig. 8).




Figure 19. The share of emigrants in the populations of countries of origin by income level, 1960, 1990, 2020, %

Source: World Bank, 2023c, p. 46

The share of immigrants and naturalized citizens in the total population of high-income economies increased threefold during the specified period (Fig. 20).




Figure 20. The share of immigrants in the population structure of host countries, by income level (1960, 1990, 2020), %

Source: World Bank, 2023

More than 40% of all international migrants in 2020 (115 million people) were born in Asia, and approximately 20% migrated primarily from six countries: India (the country of origin of the largest number of migrants), China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. Mexico is the second-most common migrant origin country in the world (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021).

Since 1970, the main destination country for international migrants has been the USA: the number of people born abroad but living in the USA increased by almost 4 times during 1970–2020 – from 12 million to almost 51 million people. The second-most common host country – Germany – also increased this indicator: from 8.9 million in 1970 to 16 million in 2020 (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021).

The largest share of emigrants comes from middle-income economies. These people do not belong to either the poorest or the richest strata of the population in their countries of origin, and have a motive and incentive to move. At the same time, in most countries only a small share of the population from the specified group emigrate to another country (Fig. 21).




Figure 21. Number of emigrants by income level of country of origin (million people), and the share of emigrants from the population of the country of origin (%), 2020

Source: Calculations based on World Bank, 2023; UNDESA, Population Division, 2020

A characteristic feature of the development of international migration processes is the dominance of labor migration in structural migration flows. In the conditions of globalization, labor migration expands the spatial range of professional self-realization, forming the latent intentions of migration movements.

According to UN data (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020), the number of international migrants as of 2020 is 282 million people, of whom 252 million are aged 15 and older. The number of economically active migrants (aged 15 to 70) is

gradually increasing, while the share of economically active migrants in the total number of migrants remains almost unchanged: 78.9% in 1990, 81.5% in 2020 (Fig. 22).




Figure 22. Distribution of international migrants by age group (million people), and share of migrants aged 15 to 70 in the total number of migrants (%), 1990–2020

Source: UNDESA, Population Division, 2020

It is characteristic that with an increase in the number of labor migrants, their share in the total number of working-age migrants constantly decreases: in 2013 – 72.7%, in 2017 – 70.0%, and in 2020 – 69.0% (ILO, 2015, 2018, 2021; Fig. 23).




Figure 23. The number of labor migrants (million people) and the share of labor migrants in the total number of migrants of working age (%), 2013–2020

Source: ILO (2015, 2018, 2021)

Changes in the labor force participation rates of international migrants are usually caused by the same determinants that affect the non-migrant population. According to ILO forecasts, the general decline in the level of participation in the labor force which has been observed since 1990 will continue at least until 2030 (ILO, 2015; Krueger, 2017).

In 2020, 67% of labor migrants, or almost 113.9 million people, lived in high-income economies. Another 49 million labor migrants (29%) lived in middle-income economies, while 6.1 million (3.6%) lived in low-income economies.

The concentration of international labor migrants in upper-middle-income and high-income economies has remained stable in recent years: 86.4% in 2013, 86.5% in 2017, and 86.9% in 2020. However, two categories of countries have undergone noticeable changes over time: from 2013 to 2020, high-income economies showed a 7.3% decrease in the number of migrant workers (from 74.7% to 67.4%), while upper-middle-income economies showed an increase of 7.8% in the same period (from 11.7% to 19.5%; Fig. 24). This perceptible shift was likely influenced by economic growth in middle-income economies and changes in the legislative framework regulating labor migration in high-income economies (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021).




Figure 24. The structure of the distribution of labor migrants by host country income level, 2013–2020, %

Source: McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (2021)

Regarding the share of migrant workers in the total labor force, it is insignificant

across low- (2.3%), lower- (1.4%), and upper-middle-income economies (2.2%), and much higher in high-income economies (18.2%; Fig. 25) (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021).




Figure 25. The share of labor migrants in the total workforce by country income level, 2013–2020, %

Source: McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (2021)

In all groups of country income levels, the level of participation of international migrants in the labor force is higher than that of non-migrants, and this gap is especially significant in countries with a high level of income – 11.5% (Fig. 26).




Figure 26. Labor force participation rate of migrants and non-migrants by country income level, 2022 (% of population aged 15 and over)

Source: World Bank (2023)

According to the OECD (2023), on average, almost 80% of migrants were

economically active in 2022, while more than 70% were employed and less than 8% were unemployed. In more than half of the OECD countries, the employment rate of migrants was at its highest level in more than two decades. In addition, this period showed faster growth in both the employment rate and the labor force participation rate among migrant women than men (a narrowing of the gender gap) in a number of countries.

The reasons for migration are different, as motives partly reflect countries' socio-economic conditions and the need for international protection. Movement patterns vary and are driven by the need to seek new economic opportunities in destination countries and the needs of those moving, including factors such as conflict and well-founded fears of persecution. However, in some situations people seek both opportunity and security.

The decision to migrate is complex and forces people to consider their options: stay, move within their own country, or migrate abroad. Some migrants decide to move on their own, while others do so with the support of a certain group – family or community. Many factors are taken into account in the decision to migrate, including both economic and personal considerations. Potential migrants compare their expected well-being under different situations and the corresponding costs of moving – both financial and non-financial. As a result, migrants choose the option that will allow them to achieve their goals faster, whether they relate to economic prospects, social and psychological well-being, or security.

The vast majority of migrants (more than 80%) move in search of better opportunities in the country of destination. Their movement trends are usually stable in the medium term. These migrants are driven mainly by considerations of higher potential wages and access to better services. Although they are not refugees, some of these migrants also move in search of a higher level of personal security, stronger rule of law, and a greater degree of personal freedom.

According to 2020 data, the vast majority of migrants and naturalized citizens

(around 80%) live in higher-income economies than their countries of origin. Where people come from largely determines where they go. But the main driver for movement is the demand for skills in the labor markets of destination countries, historical and geographical ties, and the costs of migration.

Most migrants from low-income economies migrate to other low-income economies or to middle-income economies, often because the cost of moving to high-income economies is prohibitively high. Migrants from middle-income economies often move to high-income economies. Similarly, many emigrants from high-income economies move to other high-income economies.

In terms of labor migration, these trends are very similar. At the same time, high indicators of labor migrant involvement in the economies of host countries indicate the crucial role of migrants in economic development. Ensuring stable economic growth in high-income economies is currently impossible without the labor potential of migrants. Low birth rates and an aging population in these countries force the implementation of appropriate migration policies to ensure a stable influx of highly skilled labor. An inappropriate and ineffective migration policy leads to social tension, political instability, and a decrease in the rate of economic development.

1.3. The global contours of the formation of migration policy

The phenomenon of international labor migration acquires new characteristics in contemporary conditions. Specifically, migration is becoming not only one of the factors and components of the globalization process, but also a means of solving economic problems, primarily for host countries. The mass nature of international migration reflects socio-economic changes, the manifestation of which must be considered when outlining the global contours of migration policy.

At present, international migration is driven by factors of the internal economic development of individual countries and the needs of global development

as a whole. At the same time, it serves as one of the objective prerequisites for the formation of an integrated global economic system.

In recent decades, the distribution of migration flows between countries of origin and destination countries has shown stable trends. Among destination countries, economically developed countries dominate. Over the past 20 years, the top 10 destination countries have consistently included the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia (Fig. 27).




Figure 27. Top 10 destination countries for migrants, 2000 and 2020, million people

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

In developed countries, the overall structural labor force deficit is a result of a demographic transition, and requires substantial compensatory net immigration to maintain the economically active population. This leads to the intensification of international labor migration and, consequently, to the redistribution of labor resources on a global scale.

A pool of “permanent immigration” countries has formed – the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Their migration policies are directly aimed at encouraging long-term migrant stays as a basis for economic growth. However, many conditions must be met for this to be effective. In the context of studying

the formation of the global contours of migration policy, it is also important to examine the experiences of Germany and France, as they are among the top 10 countries that host the highest number of migrants and have diverse experiences in implementing migration policies.

The importance of analyzing the migration policies of the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and France (Fig. 28) is determined by the commonality of state migration policy guidelines amid different migration characteristics in these countries.




Figure 28. Number of international migrants in selected countries, 2020

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

The current migration policy of the **United States of America** is a complex system that, on the one hand, has stable components. On the other hand, it dynamically changes under global economic transformations. The primary objectives of US migration policy are the protection of national interests, national security, and the promotion of the effective functioning of the national labor market.

The United States is the largest host country in the world: in 2020, the number of international migrants in the USA (50.63 million people) was 3.2 times greater than the next country in the ranking – Germany (15.75 million people; Fig. 27).

The number of migrants in the USA has been constantly increasing over recent decades: according to the International Organization for Migration, during 1990–2020, the number of migrants in the country more than doubled – by 117%, or by 27.38 million people, from 23.25 to 50.63 million (Fig. 29).




Figure 29. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of the USA, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Against the backdrop of the USA labor force increasing from 127.4 million people in 1990 to 165.6 million people in 2020, the share of migrants in the structure of the country’s labor force also grew (Fig. 30) – from 14.5% in 1990 to 24.8% in 2020 (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020).




Figure 30. The US labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

The volume of migration to the USA is influenced by the country's visa policy, which allows citizens of certain countries to travel to the USA without a visa if they meet specific requirements under American law. For citizens of all other countries, as well as for long-term immigration, a visa is required. The full list of requirements and special situations is available on the website of the US Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs (Travel.State.Gov, 2023).

Regarding the number of visas issued annually according to the US Immigration Act, there is a federal limit of 700,000. However, the country did not approach this migration limit in any year of the past decade (Koop, 2022).

In addition to the general federal immigration policy, the number of visas granted by the USA is also influenced by programs that reflect the interests of individual states. For example, the states of Maine, Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia focus on attracting healthcare workers; the states of Utah, Minnesota, and Arizona focus on ensuring immigrants' access to higher education, etc. More and more states recognize the importance of immigrants for community development and invest in their well-being (Avilez, 2023).

In the period leading up to 2060, it is expected that the share of the US population that is American-born is going to grow by 20%. Meanwhile, the share of the population that is foreign-born is expected to jump by 58% (Koop, 2022).

Overall, US migration policy emphasizes the complexity and variety of visas for those who wish to come to the country. Detailed algorithms for obtaining different types of visas and their compliance with national requirements regarding the composition of immigrants allow an effective system of migration control to function at the national level, prioritizing the protection of national interests.

The implementation of **Canada's** migration policy is carried out at both the federal and regional (provincial) levels. Current immigration legislation in Canada provides for an orderly flow of migrants, and the migration system includes control over not only the number of individuals entering the country, but also the

categories of occupation that they represent. Primarily, this involves regulated, planned migration programs.

A defining feature of Canada is that its migration policy is fundamental to ensuring the country's economic growth, as it addresses issues of an aging population and labor shortages. Immigration is crucial for Canada's economy, accounting for 90% of the growth of the country's labor force (Bhabra, 2023). This constitutes three-quarters of the total population growth (3.7 million people). In 2022, Canada's population grew by more than 1 million people (+1,050,110 individuals), marking the highest annual population growth rate (+2.7%) since records began in 1957. Almost all of the recorded growth (95.9%) was due to international migration (Statistics Canada, 2023).




Figure 31. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of Canada, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Canada ranked 7th in the world among destination countries for migrants in 2000, and 8th in 2020 (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020; Fig. 27). According to the International Organization for Migration, the share of migrants in Canada's total population in 2020 was 21.3% (the number of migrants exceeded 8.05 million people; UNDESA, Population Division, 2020; McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021), which is significantly higher than in the USA, the leading country in terms

of migrant inflow (15%; Fig. 28). The share of immigrants in Canada's labor force (Fig. 32) is higher than in the overall population. Since the 1980s, Canada's policy has aimed at implementing a strategy to enhance the country's competitiveness (Stakanov, 2017), facilitated by stimulating innovation and attracting highly skilled workers to key economic sectors.




Figure 32. Canada's labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

Currently, the annual immigration volume to Canada is around 500,000 people, and according to the country's Immigration Levels Plans, this trend will continue at least until 2025, with a focus on economic migration: the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) plans to admit over 485,000 immigrants to Canada in 2024, and 500,000 immigrants in 2025 (Government of Canada, 2022).

Immigration in Canada is seen as a strategy aimed at attracting skilled workers to key sectors, including healthcare, manufacturing, and technology, in order to proactively address social and economic issues that the country may face in the coming decades. Canada implements a non-discriminatory and universal policy for admitting migrants. A severe labor shortage underpins the priorities of the development of the state's migration policy.

In recent years, several modern trends have emerged in Canada's migration regulation system. Specifically, the government is focusing on the digital transformation of data processing and customer service speed to expedite the review of immigration applications. Additionally, the competition for talent is intensifying to fill job vacancies in the labor market and promote economic development (Fragomen, 2023, pp. 4–7).

At the same time, the importance of regional economic immigration programs is growing in the context of ensuring the sustainable development of the country. Migration development plans indicate continued support for regions (provinces) in their efforts to attract qualified migrants to address labor shortages and demographic problems.

Canada's migration policy is aimed at strengthening the country's position as one of the most favorable places in the world for highly skilled labor. This forms the basis for further economic growth, unites families, and helps fulfill the country's humanitarian commitments (Izium & Shuba, 2021). Canada's immigration policy is considered one of the most advanced and progressive in the world: the national labor market demonstrates high foreigner engagement rates, indicating the high effectiveness of migration policy, while the government continuously improves migration regulation by introducing modernization and innovative approaches to managing migration flows (Stakanov, 2017).

Australia's migration policy is focused on attracting new residents in response to contemporary challenges related to the development of the economic system amidst digital transformations and an aging population, while considering the diversity of immigrants, including their cultures and nationalities. Currently, Australia's migration policy is a complex and dynamic system that is constantly being improved. The goals of Australia's migration policy include attracting migrants whose qualifications and professional skills meet the needs of the Australian economy, actively combating illegal migration by establishing stricter

requirements in migration legislation, and promoting the principles of cultural diversity.

According to the International Organization for Migration, the number of migrants in Australia nearly doubled from 3.96 to 7.69 million people from 1990 to 2020 (Fig. 33), increasing from 23.3% to 30.1% of the total population during this period (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020).




Figure 33. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of Australia, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

The majority of migration is labor migration: according to the priorities of the state's migration policy, the share of migrants in the labor force began to increase rapidly from 2005, rising from 35.7% to 42.7% in 2020 (Fig. 34).

Moreover, the share of migrants in Australia's total population (30.1% in 2020) is significantly higher than in Canada, a country whose migration policy is also focused on attracting migrants (21.3%), particularly into the labor force (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (eds.), 2021) (Fig. 33).

A key element of Australia's system for regulating labor migration is the Skilled Occupation List (SOL), which outlines the professions for which migrants wishing to work in Australia can be accepted. The SOL is regularly updated in response to changes in the Australian labor market. Additionally, there is the

Priority Migration Skilled Occupation List (PMSOL), which is temporary: certain professions may be prioritized depending on the country’s situation (Department of Home Affairs, n.d.-b).

Overall, Australia’s migration system is designed to attract those who are already educated and have extensive work experience, as they can bring their children and work in one of the sectors the country needs workers in. Currently, Australia is focused on labor migration by actively increasing quotas for skilled visas: the number of skilled visas available under the migration program rose significantly in 2023 to 142,400, compared to 79,600 in 2022 (Chang, 2022).




Figure 34. Australia’s labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

Several trends stand out in Australia’s migration policy.

First, a specialized international labor mobility program – the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme – has been implemented. This program focuses on labor mobility opportunities for Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste in Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.).

Second, autonomous powers have been expanded, increasing the number of migration visas sponsored by states and territories.

Third, family reunification has been facilitated through the introduction of

demand-driven partner visas, with no limits on the number of such visas.

Fourth, the order of document processing for visa issuance has changed based on national and regional labor market priorities (Department of Home Affairs, n.d.-a).

In general, Australia's migration policy is characterized by the following comprehensive features:

1. A formalized immigration procedure: clear and public guidelines regarding who the country expects (in terms of age, marital status, educational background, and the presence of children), with minimal government intervention in residence permit issuance, supported by online systems.
2. A consistent increase in migrant share: ensuring a small but consistent annual increase in the share of individuals the country attracts, primarily in the employment sector.
3. A public information campaign: a well-thought-out information campaign to support migration, explaining its necessity, the lack of threat to society, and its economic benefits, with zero tolerance for illegal migration.
4. A clear citizenship acquisition program: a clear program for acquiring citizenship after meeting certain criteria (residence, property, or a combination thereof).

In conclusion, Australia's migration policy is designed to attract and integrate skilled migrants effectively, addressing both economic needs and demographic challenges while promoting cultural diversity and maintaining stringent controls against illegal migration. This comprehensive and adaptive approach underscores Australia's commitment to fostering a robust and dynamic migration system that contributes positively to its economic and social landscape.

New Zealand is among the countries that receive the most migrants globally, with immigration processes being one of the main drivers of the country's economic growth and a crucial factor in the development of New Zealand society. Currently, New Zealand's migration policy represents a complex and dynamic

system that has ensured a high level of sanctioned immigration per capita over a long period. According to the International Organization for Migration, from 1990 to 2020, the number of migrants in New Zealand more than doubled (Fig. 35), growing from 518,000 to 1.382 million people, while their share of the population almost doubled, from 15.2% to 28.7% (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020).




Figure 35. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of New Zealand, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

The bulk of migration is labor migration, with the share of migrants in the labor force increasing over the last 30 years: from 23.5% in 1990 to 37.7% in 2020 (Fig. 36). According to OECD data, the percentage of the population born abroad in New Zealand is among the highest of all OECD countries: 26.8% of New Zealand residents were born abroad, placing New Zealand between Australia (29.9%) and the United States (13.6%) in this regard (OECD, 2024).




Figure 36. New Zealand's labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

Migrants constituted 28.7% of New Zealand's total population in 2020 (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). This is higher than the rates in Canada (21.3%) and the USA (15%) (Fig. 28).

Overall, New Zealand's modern immigration policy has several goals, each aimed at providing significant social and economic benefits to the country. Since the mid-1980s, the government's active immigration policy has been aimed at (Bedford, 2003; New Zealand Immigration, n.d.):

- Human resource augmentation: selecting migrants who can quickly and effectively integrate their skills with professional opportunities in New Zealand. Since 1991, a points-based selection system has been used.
- The development of strong international relations: achieved through a system of bilateral agreements with countries in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa.
- The promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation: attracting migrants and business visitors with entrepreneurial skills and experience.
- Skill formation and an employment strategy: providing temporary work permits to address short-term skilled labor shortages.
- Family reunification: meeting the humanitarian needs of those with close family ties to New Zealand residents.
- The fulfillment of international obligations: through refugee programs,

approximately 700 asylum seekers are granted refugee status annually.

- The maintenance of high social cohesion: in an increasingly diverse multi-cultural society, New Zealand's immigrant selection system is non-discriminatory based on country of origin, but favors immigrants who are proficient in English and possess educational and professional qualifications recognized by the New Zealand Qualifications Authority and Professional Associations.

New Zealand's modern migration policy provides numerous opportunities for foreign citizens. Visa requirements, processing times, employment rights, and benefits for accompanying family members depend on the visa category. New Zealand operates a unified visa system, with all types of visas clearly coordinated with the goals of potential immigrants. Depending on these goals, different tools of the state's migration policy are used.

An important component of the country's migration system is the presence of the Green List, a list of professions in demand in New Zealand.

There is a clear recognition and acceptance in New Zealand society that it will become more diverse in terms of ethnic and cultural groups over the next 20 years. Immigration will continue to play a vital role in community diversification, particularly concerning immigration from Asian countries. There is a broad consensus in society that this should not be feared or resisted. There is an understanding that continued immigration at current or higher levels will have positive effects on the economy and society.

This approach to immigration policy partly reflects the growing recognition by New Zealand's leadership that the root causes of migration lie beyond the country's control, at the level of the global economy.

In conclusion, New Zealand's migration policy is geared towards attracting skilled migrants, fostering economic growth, and maintaining social cohesion. By implementing a comprehensive and adaptive approach, New Zealand ensures that immigration continues to provide significant benefits to both its economy

and society.

A distinctive migration policy feature of **Germany** is its response to having the oldest population in Europe and one of the lowest birth rates in the world (9.08% in 2022). To compensate for this shortage in skilled labor, Germany implements a comprehensive migration policy aimed at expanding pathways for the immigration of skilled workers from various countries.

At the current stage, the priority directions of Germany's migration policy concerning the goals of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration include:

- integration (social and economic);
- access to the German labor market;
- preventing and combating extremism;
- addressing the root causes of illegal migration.

Between 1990 and 2020 (Fig. 37), the number of migrants residing in Germany steadily increased – by 4.3 million people, or 72%, by 2015, and then by another 5.6 million people, or 6.3%, over the next 5 years. The proportion of international migrants in the population structure increased by 11.3% over 30 years (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020).




Figure 37. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of Germany, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Germany is one of the most attractive Western European countries for immigration. In recent years, it has accepted more immigrants than the rest of Europe combined, and has been characterized by a consistently positive migration balance. Germany ranked third among the main destination countries for international migrants in 2000; it had moved up to second place globally by 2020 (Fig. 27). According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis), in 2022, 23.8 million people (29% of the population) had migrant backgrounds, and the number of foreign citizens was 13.4 million (Destatis, 2023).

Most international migration consists of labor migrants, whose share in the German labor force increased from 13.2% in 1990 to 26.3% in 2020 (Fig. 38). From 1990 to 2015, the proportion of international migrants in the labor force increased by 6.5% (from 13.2% to 19.7%), and over the next 5 years (2015–2020), it increased by 6.6% (from 19.7% to 26.3%) (World Bank, 2023).




Figure 38. Germany's labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

Germany has a clear and transparent set of rules and regulations regarding migration. The need for a visa depends on the country of origin and the purpose of arrival. For example, EU citizens do not need a visa to visit, reside, or work in Germany.

Employment for migrants in Germany is possible in two ways:

- unregulated professions: employment without the recognition of professional qualifications (e.g., fruit and vegetable picking, work in greenhouses).
- regulated professions: employment with mandatory recognition of professional qualifications.

Besides the complex of regulated professions, Germany has identified a list of niche (shortage) professions. The country currently needs well-trained workers in almost all sectors, with high demand particularly for doctors, nursing staff, IT specialists, engineers, and heating technology experts (Giehle, 2022; Make it in Germany, n.d.-a; Anerkennung in Deutschland, n.d.).

To compensate for the shortage of skilled labor and stimulate the attraction of qualified immigrants, Germany seeks new tools to regulate labor resource flows. This includes the introduction of a new immigration law – the new Skilled Immigration Act – which creates and expands pathways for the immigration of skilled workers from non-EU countries. As a result of this reform, skilled workers will find it easier to immigrate to Germany, and refugees will be able to obtain work permits more quickly. Among other measures, a points-based system based on the Canadian model is planned, as well as the simplification of the recognition of foreign professional qualifications (Make it in Germany, n.d.-b).

Key features of Germany's modern migration policy include the following:

1. The promotion of labor migration considering criteria such as age, qualifications, professional experience, and language proficiency;
2. The facilitation of foreigner integration: simplifying citizenship procedures and providing state social assistance in defined cases;
3. The stimulation of qualified workers to overcome national labor market challenges;
4. The availability of different types of temporary and permanent residency permits;
5. An EU blue card, the most common type of temporary residence permit

for labor migration;

6. The reduction of illegal immigration: strengthening measures to decrease the number of illegal immigrants and simplifying deportation procedures.

In conclusion, Germany has maintained an open labor market for skilled workers in recent years and continues to implement new rules to attract international talent. The main goals of modern migration policy in Germany are to overcome the shortage of skilled labor in the national labor market, reduce the financial burden associated with migration on the state and federal states, and minimize illegal migration.

A characteristic feature of **France** is its high standard of living amidst an aging population. Although, unlike most European countries, France has a stable birth rate (the total fertility rate was 1.83 children per woman in 2020, 1.84 in 2021, 1.79 in 2022, and 1.68 in 2023; Statista Research Department, 2023b; INSEE, 2024a), this does not resolve demographic issues. The percentage of the population over 65 years of age is increasing, while the share of those aged 15–64 is decreasing. Therefore, the use of migration levers to influence the population structure is becoming increasingly significant at the state level.

In the 2000 global ranking of destination countries for international migrants, France ranked fifth (with 6.28 million international migrants), and it was in eighth place by 2020 (8.53 million) (Fig. 27).

The number of international migrants in France steadily increased between 1990 and 2020 (Fig. 39), growing by 2.63 million and raising the share of migrants in the country's population by almost 3% – from 10.4% in 1990 to 13.1% in 2020 (UNDESA, Population Division, 2020). For comparison, the share of immigrants in France in 1968 was 6.5% (INSEE, 2024b).




Figure 39. Dynamics of the number of international migrants and their share in the population of France, 1990–2020, million people, %

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2020)

Among immigrants living in France in 2022, 48.2% were born in Africa, 32.3% in Europe, and 14% in Asia. The main countries of origin of immigrants are Algeria (12.5%), Morocco (11.9%), Portugal (8.2%), Tunisia (4.7%), Italy (4.0%), Spain (3.5%), and Turkey (3.3%) (INSEE, 2024b). With the increase in the number of migrants in the country starting from 2005, the share of migrants in the labor force has also risen – from 17.6% in 1990 to 20.0% in 2020 (Fig. 40). According to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of France (INSEE), immigrants held every tenth job in the country in 2020 (Picart, 2023).




Figure 40. France's labor force and the percentage of migrants aged 15–64, 1990–2020, million, %

Source: World Bank (2023)

The majority of residence permits in France were issued to citizens of countries outside the European Union, the European Economic Area, and Switzerland – 316,200 in 2022. Moreover, from 2011 to 2022, the share of residence permits issued for economic reasons nearly doubled: from 17,700 to 51,700, an increase of 193%, or from 9% to 16% of the total number of residence permits (Ministère de l'intérieur et des Outre-mer, 2023).

It is noteworthy that at the beginning of 2023, the majority of employers (61%) expected difficulties in hiring (3.1% more compared to 2022) across most professions, especially in the hospitality and catering sector, industry, construction, healthcare, and social work (EURES, 2023). Concurrently, the issue of the increasing number of refugees is becoming more pressing. In the third quarter of 2023, the number of asylum applications accepted at the first instance in France (10,515 applications) was the highest since 2014. These figures have sharply risen since the end of 2020, reflecting the European migration crisis that began in 2015 (Statista Research Department, 2023a).

Foreign nationals wishing to enter France need an entry visa (short-term or long-term), unless they are on the list of exceptions. The type of visa required depends on the duration of stay and the purpose of the visit: tourism, work, study, or family.

In 2022, France continued measures aimed at simplifying the employment conditions for skilled labor migrants, particularly through the possibility of conducting online procedures to obtain the “Passport Talent” residence permit (EMN France, 2023). Throughout 2023, France took steps to enhance the effectiveness of its state migration policy, particularly regarding the simplification of asylum application procedures and the deportation of criminals or radicalized foreigners, and easing the acquisition of residence permits for migrants working in sectors with labor shortages.

Thus, the current migration policy of France is a comprehensive system that

combines directive and democratic management methods. It aims to enhance the effectiveness of measures in regulating legal migration while simultaneously strengthening the effectiveness of measures related to combating illegal migration.

In December 2023, certain components of the migration policy were updated in the Immigration Law, which addresses the needs of protecting France's national interests, particularly by simplifying the deportation of illegal migrants and tightening the conditions for receiving state aid.

The analysis of the migration policies of the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (countries of "permanent immigration"), as well as Germany and France (among the top 10 in terms of migrant influx) allows a set of common features to be identified in the migration policies of these countries:

- the protection of national economic interests;
- the priority of skilled immigration;
- the identification of priority sectors for attracting migrants;
- the decentralization of migration policy implementation;
- the involvement of accredited employers in addressing labor resource needs;
- a points-based system for immigrant admission;
- the prevention of illegal migration.

It can be concluded that the migration policy of these countries is directly aimed at encouraging the long-term stays of skilled migrants, which is recognized as one of the crucial foundations of their economic growth. The commonality in the directions of the migration policies of the studied countries occurs due to the dependence of their labor resource on foreign labor, particularly regarding highly skilled workers. This reinforces the labor resource factor of international migration and determines the nature of global labor resource needs amidst the global labor resource crisis. Given the scale and direction of migration movements, international migration acts as a systemic precondition for significant

transformations in the global labor resource space. This is the basis of the modern contours of the migration policies of countries, and determines the necessity of further in-depth research in this area.

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