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TRANSFORMATION OF SWITZERLAND'S CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

The article discusses changes in Switzerland's foreign policy caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war. Switzerland, a country with a neutral status since 1815, is experiencing significant shifts in international relations, where neutrality is no longer a reliable security guarantee. Switzerland's support for Ukraine is crucial, both in terms of practical material assistance and influencing the global political elite, the public, and the country's image as it engages in warfare.

The adaptation of Switzerland's foreign policy in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war is examined through its Euro-Atlantic orientation, specifically its relations with the European Union and NATO. Switzerland's current position regarding the war and its "perpetual neutrality" hinges on its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy.

Keywords: *Russia-Ukraine War, neutrality, European Union, NATO, Switzerland, Swiss foreign policy.*

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For a long time, Switzerland's neutrality has served as the cornerstone of the country's foreign policy, ensuring stability and security on the international stage. Swiss business consultant, lobbyist, and former diplomat Thomas Borer explains that neutrality is as deeply ingrained in Switzerland's national consciousness as milk chocolate, expensive watches, and alpine cheese. However, Thomas Borer, who directed the development of the globally renowned policy of official neutrality for the country 30 years ago, now calls for the cancellation of this policy and choosing a side (Serhan, 2023). President of the Swiss Confederation Alain Berset unequivocally stated that neutrality does not mean indifference (Kučera, Cassidy, 2023).

Switzerland's neutral status, recognized at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was intended to provide internal unity for the country consisting of 26 cantons divided by linguistic, cultural, and religious characteristics. It positioned Switzerland as a potential mediator in resolving conflicts between other opposing states.

However, after February 24, 2022, the Swiss platform of stability and security found itself in a state that O. Scholz defined as "Zeitenwende" or "a turning point in the history of our continent" (Scholz, 2022). J. Borrell called it the "perfect storm." (EU Ambassadors Annual Conference, 2022). Under these conditions, the relevance of neutrality policy in its usual form and its transformation and adaptation to current realities became a significant issue. The choice of sides, wavering between "profit and values" after Russia's large-scale aggression, is considered the beginning of the "corrosion" of Swiss neutrality. (Boldonfi, 2022).

Switzerland's position in the fight against the aggressor is of great importance to Ukraine. Firstly, real financial assistance (participation in sanctions, blocking Russian assets) is a substantial contribution both during the war and in the perspective of post-war reconstruction. During the World Economic Forum (WEF) in January 2023, Swiss Foreign

Minister Ignazio Cassis stated that frozen Russian assets "could possibly be used to rebuild Ukraine." (Leutenegger, 2023).

Secondly, the prioritization of values over profit by a country like Switzerland has a significant impact on the global political elite, public opinion and Ukraine's image. Ukraine, as a country fighting not only for its sovereignty but also for a system of international security where the rule of law prevails over the law of force, benefits greatly from this stance. The United States highly appreciated Switzerland joining Western sanctions, and President Joe Biden used it to underscore the moral justification of the Western community during his State of the Union address, stating that "even Switzerland" imposed economic sanctions against Russia (Berni, 2023).

Thirdly, Switzerland's neutral status provides Ukraine with grounds to assess all the risks associated with a non-aligned or neutral status that some try to impose on it as a so-called "peace plan."

Given the above, the specific research aims to identify adaptive changes in Switzerland's foreign policy in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The unique position of the Swiss Confederation in global geopolitics, the current realities of departing from the traditional strategy of neutrality, and the response to contemporary challenges are the focus of attention for scholars, experts, and policymakers. Domestic researchers such as A. Zhuravlova, O. Kapinus, N. Melnyk, and foreign researchers like K. Nerlist, F. John, L. Ross, A. Kotti, A. Talmann, among others, have analyzed the features of Switzerland's cooperation with NATO and the EU in the current stage of their implementation.

Ukrainian scholars such as R. Mykhalchuk, Ya. Glushchenko, I. Shevel, as well as foreign researchers like S. Bjarne, E. Patt, A. Dosi, S. Fisher, T. Coté, have paid attention to the peculiarities of Switzerland's Ukrainian vector in foreign policy. In this context, they have explored the politics of neutrality and its relevance during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The empirical basis of the study consists of normative legal acts that establish Switzerland's neutral status, including the Federal Constitution of Switzerland, the V Hague Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, and the XIII Hague Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Furthermore, agreements on confidential information exchange with NATO in 2022, bilateral agreements I (1999) and II (2004), agreements on customs support and transport of goods, and more are sources that provide insight into the implementation of Switzerland's neutral principles in its relations with other countries and international organizations. Statements, speeches, and addresses by relevant state and political figures regarding Switzerland's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war, its involvement in sanctions, and aid to Ukraine also serve as sources for the study.

The theoretical and methodological framework of the research is based on a systemic approach. This approach highlights how neutral countries are integrated into the regional and European system of international relations. In particular, it emphasizes that these countries not only engage in political, economic, and military cooperation but also adjust their own principles of foreign policy to adapt to a changing system. The central category of this research is the institution of neutrality, especially the Swiss model.

Switzerland's foreign policy strategy is based on internal principles rather than the pursuit of purely foreign policy goals. One of the main features of Swiss state policy is to determine the country's position on the international stage, which adheres to the principle of permanent neutrality. Switzerland's permanent armed neutrality status was officially recognized by other European countries during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and is enshrined in Switzerland's Federal Constitution, articles 173 and 185, as "permanent and armed." The Federal Assembly and the Federal Council are obliged to take the necessary

measures to preserve Switzerland's external security, independence, and neutrality. Switzerland's foreign policy is rooted in the principle of "maintenance." "The Federal Assembly and the Federal Council must take necessary measures to preserve the external security, independence, and neutrality of Switzerland." (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 2021). Perpetual neutrality refers to the international legal status of a state, whereby it is obligated not to participate in armed conflicts that may arise between states, refrain from joining military alliances and blocs, and not provide its territory for foreign troops and military bases.

At the state level, Switzerland's foreign policy, in accordance with the constitution of the country, is built considering the international legal status of perpetual neutrality. The legal status of Switzerland as a neutral state at the international level is regulated by both domestic legal norms and a series of international treaties, including the V Hague Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (International Humanitarian Law Databases, 1907. *Convention (V)*), and the XIII Hague Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (International Humanitarian Law Databases, 1907. *Convention (XIII)*).

It is important to note that at the core of Switzerland's neutrality policy lies the principle of "refraining." This means that a neutral state must avoid actions or policies that could involve it in an armed conflict. Switzerland's "permanent and armed neutrality" is the guiding principle of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is a fairly flexible instrument that is adapted and modified to effectively address foreign policy issues and adapt to the conditions of the new multipolar world to protect the country's interests on the international stage.

Understanding the fundamental principle that underlies Switzerland's foreign policy allows for an exploration of its role in the implementation of its foreign policy, with particular focus on the Euro-Atlantic vector, including its relations with European Union countries and NATO. The Euro-Atlantic vector of Switzerland's foreign policy determines its current position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and ultimately shapes the fate of its "permanent neutrality".

Switzerland-EU Relations in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian War

From the very inception of the European Union, it has become Switzerland's paramount partner, not only due to geographical and cultural proximity but also owing to the political and economic significance of the European Union. Ongoing discussions and negotiations in recent years and the current phase are directed towards intensifying and strengthening cooperation between Switzerland and the European Union in mutually beneficial areas. The policy of phased development in Switzerland's relations with the EU through the signing of bilateral agreements in priority areas represents a unique experience in the formation of a unified legal and economic space with European countries based on a deliberate selective approach. The network of agreements has continuously evolved, especially during the two packages of bilateral agreements I (1999) (Switzerland's European policy, 1999) and II (2004) (Switzerland's European policy, 2004).

These agreements have facilitated broad mutual market access and form the foundation for close collaboration in political spheres such as research, security, asylum, the environment, and culture. This bilateral approach enables Switzerland to pursue a policy of openness and cooperation with its European neighbors. It is of utmost importance for Switzerland to have a targeted and coordinated policy for protecting its interests in relations with the European Union. In 2009, an agreement on facilitation and security at customs was signed between the EU and Switzerland, expanding certain aspects of security compared to the agreement on the transportation of goods signed by the parties in 1990 (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 2009). Over time, as the negotiation process between

Switzerland and the EU has developed, there is an increasingly evident inclination on the part of Switzerland to utilize the gradual formation of individual segments of a unified legal field with the European Union for a progressive move towards comprehensive integration. Switzerland's political objective is to create the best possible foundation for relations with the EU. Therefore, Switzerland and the European Union have continuously developed and consolidated their network of bilateral agreements over the years. This bilateral approach was subjected to approval by the Swiss electorate in a series of referendums in 2000 (Switzerland's European policy, 2000), 2005 (Switzerland's European policy, 2004), and 2009 (Switzerland's European policy, 2009).

The Federal Council, appealing to popular will, has repeatedly emphasized the social and economic importance of the bilateral approach, allowing Switzerland to prosper while maintaining its independence, concurrently supporting and developing these relations, especially concerning market access. Since 2014, Switzerland and the EU have engaged in active negotiations on institutional issues to ensure a more consistent and effective implementation of market access agreements (Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA, 2013).

Thus, Switzerland seeks to preserve its neutrality while simultaneously fostering cooperation and integration with the EU in various domains. This has led to closer economic, political, and security ties between Switzerland and the European Union. Such a policy compels Switzerland to adapt its 'flexible' neutrality to certain conditions of cooperation.

Following the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014, particularly after the large-scale invasion in 2022, Switzerland faced the challenge of coordinating its foreign policy in accordance with the strategy of its strategic partner, the European Union.

Switzerland's Federal President, Alain Berset, in the interview with a Swiss German-language newspaper, highlighted February 24, 2022, as a pivotal moment and openly expressed the long-suppressed levels of "deep concern." He stated that, if he were honest, they were all struck by the brutality of Russia's attack on Ukraine. He mentioned that the attack had caused immense suffering, with significant cultural and economic losses. However, he added that it would be naive to think that it all started that night, emphasizing that the war began with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. He pointed out that many people did not want to see what that annexation meant (Kučera & Cassidy, 2023).

The phrase of the Swiss President, which has become almost iconic - "neutrality does not mean indifference" - serves as an explanation for Switzerland's unprecedented actions: the adoption of all EU sanctions packages against Russia, leading to the reinforcement of their impact not only materially but also significantly in moral aspects. The Federal Council tasked the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education, and Research (EAER) with amending the resolution on measures regarding the situation in Ukraine to ensure a coordinated sanction policy with the EU (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 2022).

Coordinating actions with the EU, Switzerland imposed trade and financial sanctions against the assets of individuals and companies listed in the annex to the directive. These assets were frozen with immediate effect. A prohibition on entering into new business relations with certain individuals close to the political circle of the Russian Federation also came into force. This decision underscores the country's readiness to participate in addressing global issues and take a stance on matters of global significance. Consequently, Switzerland has blocked financial assets and 15 real estate objects of Russian representatives amounting to 7.5 billion Swiss francs (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO, 2023).

One of the important and indicative sanctions imposed in connection with Russia's aggression in Ukraine is the freezing of funds and economic resources of representatives of

the ruling Russian political elite, including President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as well as companies and organizations associated with Russia. These prohibitions constitute only a small part of the sanctions imposed due to Russia's military aggression in Ukraine. Additionally, there are far-reaching measures in the goods sector, such as a ban on the export of luxury goods and items intended to strengthen Russia's industry, as well as a prohibition on the import of goods through which Russia generates significant revenue. Far-reaching financial sanctions, such as a ban on transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the exclusion of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT banking system, have also been implemented (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 2022).

In this manner, Switzerland responded to "serious violations of international law for which these individuals bear responsibility." The import, export, and investment ban concerning Crimea and Sevastopol, in effect since 2014, were extended to the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, no longer under the control of the Ukrainian government. The Federal Council also adopted an entry ban, asset freezing, prohibition on the takeoff and landing of military aircraft, as well as financial measures and a ban on trade in certain goods (Salvioni Niccolo, 2022).

This move elicited numerous ambiguous assessments and discussions regarding the degree of violation of the permanent neutrality status, its compliance with international law, and its appropriateness both domestically and abroad. Simultaneously, such a decision was grounded in the aspiration to define Switzerland's foreign policy position regarding violations of international law where the unprecedented military attack by Russia on a sovereign European country was a decisive factor in the Federal Council's decision to change its previous position on sanctions. Peace and security, as well as respect for international law, are values that Switzerland, as a democratic country, shares and supports with its European neighbors. As before, Switzerland will consider each subsequent package of sanctions imposed by the EU individually (The Federal Council. The portal of the Swiss government, 2022).

The implementation of sanctions was carried out based on the Federal Constitution (Article 184, Paragraph 3, and Article 185), stating that the Federal Council may take appropriate measures to protect the interests of the country or external security, independence, and neutrality of Switzerland. In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Federal Council of Switzerland believes that the policy of neutrality, as defined and implemented after the report on neutrality dated November 29, 1993, will remain in effect (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 1994). However, decisions made by the Federal Council since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, such as the implementation of EU sanctions against Russia, are compatible with Switzerland's policy of neutrality. This policy provides the government with sufficient maneuvering space to respond to events occurring on the European continent since the start of the war. The current practice gives the Federal Council ample freedom of action to make effective decisions on neutrality in specific cases, taking into account the global situation.

Nevertheless, the Swiss government has once again adapted its foreign policy activities to defend national values, influencing the transformation of Swiss neutrality. The ongoing Swiss-NATO relations in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War further underscore this process.

Switzerland-NATO Relations in the Context of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The increasing relevance of international security issues has compelled Switzerland in recent years to enhance and broaden its cooperation with international organizations, particularly with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite its neutral status,

Switzerland participates in the Partnership for Peace program and joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Collaboration within these international platforms allows small Switzerland to contribute to international security, as well as express and protect its interests on the global stage. These mechanisms of cooperation align with the primary goals of the country's foreign policy, including the support of peace, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Participation in such a program is also consistent with the mission of the Swiss Armed Forces. Switzerland shares and supports the values at the core of the Partnership for Peace (Eidgenössisches Departement für, 2015).

After Russia's military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, relations between Switzerland and NATO underwent certain changes, leaning towards narrowing the scope of bilateral cooperation. Switzerland decided to focus on strengthening its own security resources rather than deepening collective cooperation. Fearing the potential application of Article 5 of the NATO treaty in the event of strained relations between the organization and Russia, Switzerland indicated that further deepening of cooperation did not align with Switzerland's fundamental principles of defending its traditional values.

Furthermore, the Swiss government announced the implementation of additional measures to enhance its defense capabilities. A supplementary report on the Security Policy for 2021, developed by the Federal Council, provided conclusions on the potential development of cooperation with NATO and the EU. This included expanding participation in exercises, opportunities for military cooperation, enhancing the partnership status with NATO, and involving the army in EU formations exclusively for rescue or humanitarian operations, or evacuation. Simultaneously, the report highlighted the necessity of accelerating the modernization of the Swiss army. The Federal Department of Defense pointed out critical deficiencies in anti-tank defense and the ability to sustain conflict in the long term, especially regarding ammunition reserves, which the ministry aims to increase (Fedlex. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts, 2021).

The shift in Switzerland's cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council after 2014, coupled with the emphasis on the modernization of its own army, signifies a focus on the principles of neutrality. This allows Switzerland to act as both a mediator and a negotiation platform because providing good services is a fundamental aspect of the country's foreign policy. It's noteworthy that NATO, too, is interested in Switzerland remaining a venue for diplomatic meetings.

Before the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, the development leaned more towards rhetoric expressing "deep concern" rather than concrete actions. NATO's presence in Eastern Europe was reinforced, and "soft issues" such as cybersecurity, new technologies, and infrastructure protection gained significance. NATO sought more active support from Switzerland, particularly in the field of cybersecurity. Switzerland, geopolitically and socio-economically included in Euro-Atlantic structures, had the opportunity to simultaneously adhere to its values and resume cooperation with NATO in non-military areas. In other domains, Switzerland and NATO continued to collaborate without significant changes, primarily through the Partnership for Peace program, contributing to the Federal Council's intention to strengthen international cooperation in security policy (Eidgenössisches Departement für, 2015).

With the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, relations between Switzerland and NATO became more complicated, requiring immediate responses. Switzerland condemned the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty but refrained from providing specific assistance, unlike most European countries, expressing its support mainly on international platforms through diplomatic means.

The direct threat to the security of EU countries due to Russia's aggression, gas and nuclear blackmail, and provocations at Europe's borders prompted discussions on strengthening the country's security sector. There were even talks about Switzerland's possible accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially after Sweden and Finland, both traditionally neutral, applied for NATO membership. According to the "Sicherheit 2023" study, the Swiss population's readiness for cooperation with NATO increased. In January 2023, 55% of respondents, a 10% increase compared to January 2021, agreed with closer ties to NATO, marking the first majority support for such a connection. However, direct NATO membership is currently supported by only one-third of respondents (Szvircsev T., Wenger A., De Rosa S., Ferst T., Rizzo E., Robert J., Roost T., 2023).

Therefore, the decreasing support for Switzerland's neutral status within the country is a significant indication of a shift in Swiss citizens' consciousness. The challenge now lies in the realization that in the current situation, it may be impossible to reliably protect not only neutrality but the country as a whole. About 35% of Switzerland's population advocates for membership in the European Defense Alliance. A similar percentage (38%) believes that close political and economic ties with other countries make neutrality impossible, hindering Switzerland from acting together with its European neighbors. Nevertheless, 57% of respondents still support Switzerland's differentiated policy of neutrality, meaning it should have a political position while remaining neutral in military terms. The majority (75%) considers sanctions against Russia compatible with neutrality (Szvircsev T., Wenger A., De Rosa S., Ferst T., Rizzo E., Robert J., Roost T., 2023).

As a result, the question of Switzerland's NATO membership is not currently a top priority for the Swiss, as the alliance does not see the necessity for Switzerland to join, influenced by several factors. Firstly, being centrally located in Europe and surrounded by NATO member countries already provides Switzerland with the advantage of being far from combat zones, minimizing the likelihood of aggression on its territory—a luxury not shared by Sweden and Finland. Secondly, NATO is more interested in Switzerland remaining a diplomatic hub, given the high regard for Switzerland's diplomatic services on the international stage, serving as a negotiation platform between conflicting nations. For instance, Geneva has hosted peace treaty negotiations, high-level meetings such as the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in 1985, and discussions between Presidents Biden and Putin in 2021 (Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA, 2021).

However, this very reason poses a challenge as Switzerland cannot remain an "island of indifference" in the midst of NATO member countries. In April 2022, the Swiss government approved a confidentiality information exchange agreement with NATO, aimed at protecting each other's secret digital information and enhancing cybersecurity. This agreement marked a step toward closer relations with the North Atlantic Alliance (Der Bundesrat. Das Portal der Schweizer Regierung, 2022).

A long-standing issue in Switzerland-NATO relations was Switzerland's refusal to supply ammunition to Ukraine. The Swiss government excluded the re-export of anti-aircraft projectiles supplied by Swiss companies to the German army several decades ago (Berufung auf Neutralität, 2022). NATO members strongly reacted to this refusal, arguing that, given the existential struggle between democracy and autocracy in Europe, relying on the principle of neutrality is not only morally questionable but also dangerous. By hindering Switzerland's ammunition exports, Switzerland obstructs Germany's efforts, as a NATO member, to fulfill its obligations.

Neutral Switzerland demands permission from countries buying Swiss weapons for re-export. According to Swiss legislation, the export of military technology should be denied if the destination country is involved in an international armed conflict. In March 2023, Viola

Amherd, a member of the Swiss Federal Council and head of the Federal Department of Defence, visited NATO headquarters for negotiations with Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and a meeting with NATO ambassadors. Her participation in the North Atlantic Council was the first in the history of the Swiss Ministry of Defence. During this meeting, the prospects of Switzerland-NATO partnership were discussed, with many NATO allies urging Switzerland to review its legislation prohibiting the re-export of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, as the country continues to resist Russia's brutal aggression (Dreyer, J., & Jesse, N. G., 2014).

The pressure arising from debates on Switzerland's role in the Russian-Ukrainian war has sparked a wave of ideas in the parliament regarding changes to arms export rules. Despite the Swiss government initially standing firm on its position, citing international neutrality laws and national military material laws, a significant shift occurred in June 2023. Switzerland approved an amendment to its legislation, allowing the re-export of weapons to Ukraine, marking a radical transformation in the concept of Swiss neutrality.

The amendment comes with conditions. Countries engaging in re-exports must share "common values" with Switzerland and have similar export controls. If the receiving country is involved in a conflict, it must invoke its right to self-defense according to international law, confirmed by a two-thirds majority vote at the UN General Assembly. The existing rules prohibit buyers of Swiss weapons from re-exporting without Bern's permission. This categorical stance forces NATO members to consider this factor when seeking Swiss production of ammunition or other military materials.

Despite the strengthened cooperation between Switzerland and NATO, this foreign policy does not provide grounds to assert that the country is "moving towards NATO." Nevertheless, in the realm of "softer aspects of security," concerns and conflicts between commitments and neutrality play a lesser role. Switzerland and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization share similar value canons, which are under threat from the rise of authoritarian states. Thus, new opportunities for synergy between NATO and some of Switzerland's numerous partners in Europe and worldwide emerge. Viewing NATO as an instrument for upholding international legal norms, Switzerland aims to direct its partnership activities with the Alliance in that direction (Larsen Von Henrik, 2019).

Under some pressure from NATO member states, the Swiss Confederation has long used "flexible neutrality" as a tool to balance between supporting the international order and preserving neutrality. However, Switzerland currently understands the importance of aligning with the NATO bloc but possesses factors that allow it not too hastily abandon its old policy of neutrality.

Analyzing the fundamental trends in Switzerland's neutrality concept and policy, it becomes evident that the country's neutrality policy is undergoing significant changes in the contemporary world. There is a gradual departure from the traditional policy of neutrality in favor of integration into international and regional political organizations and blocs. A striking example of this shift is observed in Sweden and Finland.

Switzerland's neutrality, enshrined in numerous international and national normative-legal acts, provides flexibility in its interpretation depending on internal and external circumstances. This flexibility enables the country to adapt quickly to new conditions in the international environment.

In developing its relations with NATO and the EU, Switzerland is guided by the current situation on the international stage and pragmatic considerations of its national interests, influencing the "cooling" or "warming" of relations with strategic partners. This is evident in the transformation of Switzerland's relations with the EU and NATO from the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 to its new phase in 2022 with the large-scale invasion.

Moreover, the attempt to distance itself from the policies of EU and NATO countries regarding the Ukrainian issue in 2014, justified by its neutrality, became untenable in 2022. Switzerland's choice not to take sides may not have led to direct danger, as seen in the case of Finland, but it jeopardized normal relations with strategic partners who united in condemning the aggressor and providing assistance to Ukraine.

The imposition of sanctions against Russia marked an unprecedented act in Switzerland's foreign policy and the first step in diluting its neutrality. This transformation aligns with the country's evolving external policy, compelling Switzerland to make concessions and reconsider its neutrality concept towards increasing flexibility.

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ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ СУЧАСНОЇ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ШВЕЙЦАРІЇ В КОНТЕКСТІ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Стаття присвячена змінам у зовнішній політиці Швейцарії, причиною яких є російсько-українська війна. Позиція Швейцарії, країни з нейтральним статусом з 1815 р., у процесі обрання сторони свідчить про системні трансформації міжнародних відносин, в яких нейтралітет вже не є надійною запорукою безпеки. Виказана Швейцарією підтримка Україні вкрай важлива для останньої і в плані реальної матеріальної допомоги, і, що не менш важливо, в плані великого впливу на світову політичну еліту, громадськість та імідж країни, що воює.

Визначення адаптаційних змін у зовнішній політиці Швейцарії в контексті російсько-української війни здійснюється через дослідження її євроатлантичного вектору, а саме відносинах з країнами Європейського союзу та НАТО. Нейтралітет Швейцарії, закріплений у численних міжнародних і національних нормативно-правових актах, забезпечує гнучкість у його інтерпретації залежно від внутрішніх і зовнішніх обставин. Розвиваючи свої відносини з НАТО та ЄС, Швейцарія керується поточною ситуацією на міжнародній арені та прагматичними міркуваннями національних

інтересів, впливаючи на "охолодження" чи "потепління" відносин зі стратегічними партнерами. Ця гнучкість дозволяє країні швидко адаптуватися до нових умов у міжнародному середовищі.

Адаптаційні можливості зовнішньополітичної стратегії простежено на прикладі трансформації відносин Швейцарії з ЄС та НАТО від початку російсько-української війни у 2014 році до її нового етапу в 2022 році - широкомасштабного вторгнення. Спроба дистанціюватися від політики країн ЄС і НАТО щодо українського питання у 2014 році, виправдана нейтралітетом, стала неможливою у 2022 році. Вибір Швейцарії не ставати на чийсь бік поставив би під загрозу нормальні відносини зі стратегічними партнерами, які об'єдналися в засудженні агресора та наданні допомоги Україні.

Запровадження санкцій проти Росії стало безпрецедентним актом у зовнішній політиці Швейцарії та першим кроком до розмивання її нейтралітету. Ця трансформація відповідає еволюції зовнішньої політики країни, що змушує Швейцарію йти на поступки та переглядати свою концепцію нейтралітету в бік більшої гнучкості.

Євроатлантичний вектор зовнішньої політики Швейцарії обумовлює її теперішню позицію щодо російсько-української війни і, врешті-решт, вирішує долю «постійного нейтралітету».

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, нейтралітет, Європейський Союз, НАТО, Швейцарія, зовнішня політика Швейцарії