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**HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:
DEPENDENCY TRAPS IN THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY**

Abstract. The aim of this article is to provide a systemic analysis of the American institutional architecture of development assistance, formed over six decades in three successive waves, and to substantiate the thesis that this architecture has not eliminated but merely modified the classical dependency trap. The hypothesis is that if in the 1960s–1980s dependency concerned the volume of aid, then in the 2000s–2020s it has been transformed into dependency on a particular model of the donor paradigm, which narrows the negotiating space of the partner country in its choice between the Western and the non-Western, primarily Chinese, alternatives. To verify this, the research applies analytical, structural-functional and comparative methods, supported by institutional and historical analysis, which allow the three key institutions, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), to be interpreted not as isolated agencies but as an integrated system reflecting the evolution of the very understanding of what development is. The study demonstrates that the first wave, the creation of USAID in 1961, followed the logic of the Cold War and the modernization theory of W. Rostow; the second wave, the establishment of the MCC in 2004, arose as a response to the empirical critique of the donor paradigm and the reactualization of institutional economics; and the third wave, the creation of the DFC in 2019, already reflects a geoeconomic logic of competition with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative for the mobilization of private capital.

Particular attention is devoted to the category of the economics of sanctions and to its place within the broader system of economic containment, since conditional aid and coercive statecraft constitute two poles of a single continuum of structuring incentives. As a result, the article argues that the architecture of donorship should be understood as an institutional realization of the concept of smart power, combining soft influence through attractiveness, conditional influence through the reward of reforms, and financial-investment influence through the mobilization of capital, with direct practical implications for recipient countries, including Ukraine.

Keywords: economic diplomacy; geoeconomics; geopolitics; institutional architecture of development assistance; international development finance; donor aid; sanctions policy; dependency trap; competition; soft power; Belt and Road; USA; China.

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary architecture of American development assistance represents a complex institutional landscape that has taken shape in three successive waves over six decades and reflects the evolution of the very understanding of what development is and which instruments are capable of supporting it. The first wave, the creation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961, on the initiative of President J. Kennedy, was inscribed within the logic of the Cold War and the modernization theory of W. Rostow, according to which economic assistance was to perform a dual function: the geopolitical retention of developing countries within the Western camp and the launch of their own development cycle. The second wave, the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004 on the initiative of G. W. Bush, emerged as a response to the empirical critique of the donor paradigm in the works of W. Easterly [1] and the conceptual reactualization of institutional economics, according to which it is the quality of institutions, rather than the volume of capital, that determines the trajectory of development. The third wave, the creation of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 2019, already reflects a geoeconomic logic: the United States required an instrument capable of competing with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in the mobilization of private capital for infrastructure in the countries of the Global South.

This article is devoted to a systemic analysis of all three institutions with an emphasis on two cross-cutting problems. The first is the problem of dependency traps, formulated within the Latin American critical tradition but which has acquired new relevance in debates on conditional aid. We advance the hypothesis that the contemporary architecture of donorship has not overcome but merely modified the classical dependency trap: if in the 1960s–1980s the issue concerned dependency on the volume of aid, then in the 2000s–2020s it has been transformed into dependency on a particular model of the donor paradigm, which narrows the negotiating space of the partner country in its choice between the Western and the non-Western, primarily Chinese, alternatives. The second problem is the logic of geoeconomic positioning, which increasingly openly defines the real priorities of American development institutions.

A systemic examination of the American architecture of development assistance possesses not only academic but also practical value for recipient countries. An understanding of how USAID, MCC and DFC relate to one another, which of them are subject to which political cycles, and which motivations are embedded in their architecture, allows a partner country to construct a differentiated strategy of interaction with each instrument separately and with the system as a whole. This is of particular significance for Ukraine, which has historically been one of the largest recipients of USAID assistance in the post-Soviet space, has not been included in the pool of MCC candidate countries owing to income-category criteria, and is only beginning to build an investment partnership in its relations with the DFC.

Statement of the problem. Despite the proliferation of development-assistance initiatives, the institutional architecture of American donorship remains internally heterogeneous and

analytically underconceptualized. USAID, MCC, and DFC are frequently studied in isolation as three separate agencies with their own mandates, budgets, and political cycles, obscuring the systemic logic connecting them. The core problem lies in the absence of an integrated interpretive framework that would connect the three waves of institution-building into a single continuum of instruments for structuring the incentives of partner countries, a continuum stretching from the soft attractiveness of aid to the conditional rewards of reforms and further to the mobilization of private capital for investment. Without such a synthesis, the dependency trap appears to have been overcome by the transition from unconditional to conditional aid, whereas in reality it has merely changed its form. Equally underconceptualized is the place of coercive economic instruments within this architecture: the concept of coercion and compellence, developed by T. Schelling for the security sphere, in a peaceful economic context is transformed into soft conditionality, which is not a direct demand under the threat of sanctions but a structuring of incentives such that the behavior desired by the donor becomes the best of the available options for the recipient. Addressing this gap requires interpreting conditional aid and economic containment not as opposites but as two poles of a single logic of statecraft.

ANALYSIS OF THE LATEST RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

The conceptual foundations of the analysis of development assistance have evolved through several theoretical trajectories that combine the classical logic of the developmental state with institutional and geoeconomic approaches. The empirical critique of the donor paradigm, summarized in the work of W. Easterly *The Elusive Quest for Growth* [1], demonstrated a weak or even negative correlation between the volume of aid and the pace of development, thereby laying the groundwork for a reorientation of assistance from volume toward the quality of the institutional environment. This shift found its institutional embodiment in the Millennium Challenge Corporation and, more broadly, in the philosophy of the Monterrey Consensus.

The problem of the dependency trap, in turn, is inseparable from the study of economic statecraft as such. The classical work of D. Baldwin [2] substantiated that economic instruments, whether positive incentives or negative sanctions, constitute a full-fledged tool of foreign policy comparable to diplomacy and force. The subsequent development of this line in the geoeconomic direction, in the works of R. Blackwill and J. Harris [3], demonstrated that in the modern world it is precisely economic instruments, war by other means, that increasingly displace military ones in the pursuit of strategic objectives. A key theoretical contribution was made by H. Farrell and A. Newman [4], who introduced the concept of weaponized interdependence: the very structure of global economic networks generates asymmetries that a hegemonic state is able to convert into instruments of coercion. This logic is directly applicable to the architecture of donorship, in which control over financial flows and access to capital becomes a source of structural power.

Within the domain of the economics of sanctions, the foundational study of G. Hufbauer, J. Schott and K. Elliott [5] established the empirical criteria for the effectiveness of restrictive measures, while the recent analytical work of O. Itskhoki and E. Ribakova [6] transferred the analysis of sanctions from a descriptive to a rigorously economic plane, formalizing the mechanisms of their transmission through trade, financial and currency channels. These studies allow the economics of sanctions to be understood not as an isolated punitive practice but as one of the poles of a single continuum of economic statecraft, at the opposite end of which lies conditional development assistance. Recent analyses of American containment policy in a multipolar world [7], [8] and of the political economy of containment in relation to China [9] confirm that the instruments of reward and coercion are increasingly integrated into a unified strategic architecture.

A substantial body of research interprets the contemporary transformation of the world economy as a process of fragmentation and bloc formation, which redefines the very conditions under which development assistance operates. O. Plotnikov, in his study of the risk dimension of the fragmentation of the world economy [10] and of the non-economic factors of the international movement of capital [11], demonstrates that access to development finance is increasingly determined by geopolitical alignment rather than by economic criteria alone. This perspective is reinforced by L. Kisterskyi's analysis of the preconditions for the formation of a multipolar global economy [12] and by J. L. Gaddis's foundational study of the strategies of containment in postwar American national-security policy [13], which reveals the deep historical continuity between the Cold War logic of retention and the contemporary logic of conditional aid. Research on international strategies of economic development [14] and on the minefields of international economic policy [15] situates the architecture of donorship within the wider context of countries' struggle to preserve their capacity for development.

From a macroeconomic and industrial-policy perspective, Yu. Kindzerskyi's research on inclusive industrialization [16] and on deindustrialization and its determinants [17], together with the study by L. Kisterskyi, V. Marmazov and I. Piliiaiev on the modernization experience of South Korea [18], demonstrates that the effectiveness of external assistance depends decisively on the quality of the domestic institutional environment and on the capacity of the state to convert resources into productive transformation. Overall, the reviewed literature reveals a convergence between the institutional, geoeconomic and statecraft paradigms: the architecture of development assistance appears not as a neutral technical mechanism but as an instrument of structural power, the analysis of which requires the joint consideration of conditional aid and economic containment.

The purpose of this article is to substantiate a systemic interpretation of the American institutional architecture of development assistance as an evolving continuum of instruments for structuring the incentives of partner countries, and to demonstrate that this architecture, in transitioning from unconditional to conditional aid and further to development finance, has modified rather than eliminated the classical dependency trap. Within such a framework, USAID, MCC and DFC are interpreted as an institutional realization of the concept of smart power, and conditional aid and the economics of sanctions are treated as two poles of a single logic of economic statecraft. The study aims to reveal the practical implications of this architecture for recipient countries, and in particular for Ukraine.

RESEARCH RESULTS

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is an independent agency of the United States government, established in January 2004 on the initiative of the administration of G. W. Bush. Its emergence was a response to the critique of traditional mechanisms of development assistance, which were reproached for low effectiveness, corruption-related leakages and a weak connection between financing and achieved results. The conceptual basis of the MCC's activity was the so-called Monterrey Consensus, adopted in March 2002 at the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development, which proclaimed the principle of the mutual accountability of donors and recipients for the quality of governance and made development assistance a function of the conduct of reforms in the partner country.

The institutional philosophy of the MCC rests on three key postulates: assistance is to be directed only to countries that demonstrate good governance; financing is to be linked to measurable performance indicators; and the recipient countries themselves are to assume the leading role in the design of programs, the principle of country ownership. In this respect, the MCC positions itself as a mechanism that differs fundamentally from the classical assistance of USAID or the lending of the international financial institutions. It is instructive that the MCC

formally renounces the donor-knows-best model characteristic of traditional USAID assistance and ostensibly delegates project initiative to the partner country. Nevertheless, this decentralization is limited, since the thematic corridor of projects is still set by the donor through the structure of qualifying indicators. This is precisely where the modified dependency trap manifests itself: the partner country is free to choose projects, but only within a space of possibilities predefined by the donor.

The mechanism for selecting partner countries constitutes the operational heart of the MCC model. Candidate countries are assessed against a system of approximately twenty independent indicators grouped into three categories: ruling justly, investing in people, and economic freedom. A country must pass a minimum number of these indicators, including at least one in each category, and must overcome several mandatory hard hurdles, above all the control of corruption and the observance of democratic rights, which cannot be compensated by strong performance elsewhere. The passing of this qualifying threshold is a precondition for the conclusion of a program grant agreement, the compact, a five-year, debt-free financing package concentrated on a limited number of large infrastructural and institutional projects. This design distinguishes the MCC both from the budgetary support of the international financial institutions and from the fragmented project assistance of USAID. At the same time, the indicator-based selection generates a specific risk, the risk of cosmetic reforms, whereby a partner country improves its formal indicators without a substantive transformation of the institutional environment, thereby reproducing the imitational logic characteristic of the dependency trap.

If the MCC represents the conditional-reward pole of the architecture, then USAID and the DFC mark its two extremes. USAID, which for more than six decades remained the principal instrument of American development policy until its dismantling in 2025, when the greater part of its programs were terminated, and its residual functions were transferred to the Department of State, historically balanced between a humanitarian mission and soft power. Its assistance was predominantly unconditional or weakly conditional, project-based, and oriented toward a broad range of humanitarian, social, and institutional objectives. It was precisely this model that gave rise to the classical critique of the dependency trap: the recipient country adapts to the flow of aid, forms expectations of its continuation and loses the incentives for its own institutional transformation. The MCC was conceived as an institutional alternative to this model, an attempt to convert aid from unconditional charity into a conditional function of institutional quality.

The DFC, established in 2019 through the consolidation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and part of the functions of USAID, marks the opposite, financial-investment pole. Its logic is no longer that of grants but that of the mobilization of private capital: loans, guarantees, equity participation and political-risk insurance. The creation of the DFC was a direct response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which by the second decade of the twenty-first century had become the principal instrument of infrastructural influence in the Global South. In this sense the DFC embodies the geoeconomic logic in its purest form: development assistance is transformed into an instrument of strategic competition for access to markets, resources and the political loyalty of partner countries. The dependency trap here acquires yet another modification, dependency on the source of investment capital and on the technological standards embedded in it. Taken together, the three institutions form a continuum of smart power: USAID provided soft influence through attractiveness, the MCC provides conditional influence through the reward of reforms, and the DFC provides financial-investment influence through the mobilization of capital. The dismantling of USAID in 2025 did not abolish this continuum but redistributed its soft pole, transferring the residual functions

of humanitarian and institutional assistance to the Department of State, while the conditional and the financial-investment poles, embodied in the MCC and the DFC, retained their institutional autonomy. The security-sphere concepts of coercion and compellence, in this peaceful economic context, are transformed into soft conditionality. It is at this point that the architecture of donorship converges with the economics of sanctions.

The economics of sanctions may be defined as a field of economic analysis that studies the mechanisms through which the deliberate restriction of economic interaction, in trade, finance, currency, technology or investment, is converted into an instrument of political influence, together with the costs, effectiveness and distributional consequences of such restriction for both the target state and the initiating state. In contrast to the traditional understanding of sanctions as a purely punitive practice, the modern economics of sanctions interprets them as one mode of structuring the incentives of another state, a mode located at the coercive pole of the continuum of economic statecraft. At the opposite, incentivizing pole of this same continuum lies conditional development assistance: in both cases the initiating state does not directly compel the desired behavior but restructures the system of costs and benefits of the target country in such a way that the behavior desired by the initiator becomes the best of the available options.

This definition allows the economics of sanctions to be located precisely within the system of economic containment. Economic containment is understood here as a strategy of restraining the growth of a rival state's power through the systematic structuring of its economic environment, encompassing both negative instruments (sanctions, export controls, restrictions on access to technology and capital) and positive ones (conditional aid, investment, the reward of reforms in third countries). Within this system, the economics of sanctions and the architecture of development assistance are not opposites but complementary elements: sanctions restrain the rival, while conditional aid and development finance attract third countries into the orbit of the initiating state, thereby narrowing the sphere of influence of the rival. It is precisely this integration of the poles of reward and coercion that constitutes the deep logic of contemporary economic statecraft, and it is precisely within this logic that the modified dependency trap acquires its full meaning: the partner country becomes dependent not on the volume of aid but on its own position within the architecture of the global competition of the great powers. For the analysis of the American architecture of development assistance, this conclusion is of key importance. USAID, the MCC, and the DFC are not merely instruments of aid but elements of a broader system of economic containment, within which the reward of loyal partners and the restraint of rivals constitute two sides of a single strategy. This is why the choice of a partner country between the Western and the Chinese alternatives is never a purely economic choice: it is always simultaneously a choice of position within the geoeconomic architecture, and it is precisely this that constitutes the essence of the modified dependency trap.

The interpretation of the American architecture of donorship as a continuum of smart power acquires its full analytical value only when it is compared with the alternative paradigm that emerged in the second decade of the twenty-first century: the Chinese architecture of development finance embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative. This comparison is not merely descriptive: it reveals that the modified dependency trap is not a peculiarity of the American model but a structural property of any architecture of development finance operating under the conditions of great-power competition. What differs between the two paradigms is not the presence or absence of the dependency trap but the modality through which structural power is exercised, and it is precisely the analysis of this difference in modality that allows the deep logic of contemporary geoeconomics to be discerned. The American architecture, as demonstrated above, rests on the principle of conditionality: access to financing is mediated by the qualifying

indicators of institutional quality, by the observance of the hard hurdles of the control of corruption and democratic rights, and by the philosophy of country ownership. Structural power here is exercised *ex ante*, at the stage of admission to the pool of eligible partners, through the very definition of what counts as good governance. The partner country is disciplined not by the threat of aid withdrawal but by the architecture of the criteria that determine its eligibility. In this sense, the American model realizes what may be termed conditional structural power, a power that operates through the internalization by the recipient of the donor's normative standards, whereby the reform agenda of the partner country is reoriented toward the parameters set by the qualifying matrix. The dependency trap in this model takes the form of a paradigmatic dependency: the partner country becomes dependent not on the volume of the resource but on the very model of development that grants it access to it.

Chinese architecture, by contrast, is constructed on a fundamentally different principle: unconditionality with respect to the recipient's institutional environment and conditionality with respect to the project's material and technological parameters. The Belt and Road Initiative does not impose requirements concerning the quality of governance, the control of corruption, or the observance of democratic rights; it offers financing on the basis of the commercial and geostrategic attractiveness of the infrastructural object, frequently under conditions of collateralization of assets and of the involvement of Chinese contractors, technologies, and standards. Structural power here is exercised not *ex ante* but *ex post*, at the stage of the servicing of debt obligations and of the operation of the created infrastructure. The dependency trap in the Chinese model assumes the form of infrastructural and technological dependency: the partner country becomes tied to the standards, supply chains, and debt architecture embedded in the project, which generates a long-term asymmetry in the relationship independent of the recipient's institutional trajectory. This juxtaposition allows a fundamental theoretical distinction to be formulated: the American architecture exercises structural power through the normative pre-structuring of the space of the possible, whereas the Chinese architecture exercises it through the material post-structuring of the space of the realized. The former disciplines the partner country's intentions before the allocation of the resource; the latter binds the partner country's capabilities after the allocation of the resource. Both modalities, however, converge in a single outcome, the narrowing of the negotiating space of the recipient country and the constraining of its autonomous capacity for development, which confirms the thesis that the modified dependency trap is a systemic property of the geoeconomic competition of the great powers rather than an artifact of any particular donor model.

The comparison of the two architectures leads to a conclusion of a higher order of generality, namely, that the very existence of two competing paradigms of development finance does not liberate the partner country from the dependency trap but, on the contrary, deepens it by transferring it to a meta-level. In the classical formulation of the Latin American critical tradition, the dependency trap presupposed the existence of a single center upon which the periphery was dependent. The bipolarization of the architecture of development finance, the coexistence of the Western conditional model and the Chinese infrastructural model, would appear at first glance to create for the partner country a space of choice and, consequently, of emancipation from dependency: the recipient acquires an alternative and, with it, a leverage of bargaining. Yet a more rigorous analysis demonstrates that this apparent expansion of choice is transformed into a new type of dependency: a dependence on the very act of positioning within the architecture of great-power competition.

The mechanism of this meta-dependency may be reconstructed as follows. In choosing between the Western and the Chinese alternatives, the partner country is compelled to make a choice that is never purely economic, since each alternative carries an embedded geopolitical

vector. The acceptance of American conditional financing signifies not only access to the resource but also inscription within the Western normative order, with the corresponding obligations regarding the trajectory of institutional reforms and, implicitly, regarding the geopolitical alignment. The acceptance of Chinese infrastructural financing signifies inscription within the Chinese sphere of technological standards and debt obligations, with the corresponding long-term commitments regarding supply chains and strategic loyalty. The partner country cannot occupy a position of neutrality with respect to this choice, since the very refusal to choose is interpreted by both centers as a signal, and the attempt to combine the two sources of financing generates for the recipient the risk of a double dependency rather than of an emancipatory diversification. It is precisely in this that the meta-structure of the dependency trap consists: the choice itself becomes the mechanism of capture.

This theoretical construction allows the concept of smart power to be reinterpreted in a deeper register. Smart power, in its canonical formulation, was understood as the combination of the soft power of attractiveness with the hard power of coercion, mediated by the intelligent selection of instruments appropriate to the context. The analysis of the architecture of development finance, however, reveals that in the domain of donorship smart power operates not through the alternation of soft and hard instruments but through their simultaneous integration into a single continuum, at one pole of which stands the soft attractiveness of unconditional aid, at the other the coercive restriction of sanctions, and between them the conditional reward of reforms and the financial-investment mobilization of capital. The intelligence of smart power in this domain consists not in the choice between attraction and coercion but in the construction of an architecture within which the partner country, in pursuing its own rationally understood interests, freely selects the behavior desired by the donor. This is the highest form of structural power, a power that does not compel and does not even reward directly, but structures the very space of the possible in such a way that the desired outcome appears to the partner country as the result of its own free choice. From this perspective, the dependency trap ceases to be a defect or a side effect of the architecture of development assistance and reveals itself as its constitutive principle. The architecture of donorship is not an imperfect instrument of development that inadvertently generates dependency; it is a refined instrument of structural power that realizes its function precisely through the generation of a dependency of a new, paradigmatic, and positional type. For the theory of international economic relations, this conclusion signifies that the analysis of development finance cannot be conducted within the categories of technical effectiveness alone, of the correlation between the volume of the resource and the pace of growth, but requires the categories of structural power, of geoeconomic positioning and of the meta-dependency generated by the competition of paradigms. It is precisely this theoretical reframing that constitutes the principal conceptual contribution of the present analysis and that opens the prospect for a subsequent empirical verification on the material of concrete recipient countries, including Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The conducted analysis allows the American institutional architecture of development assistance to be interpreted as an evolving continuum of instruments for structuring the incentives of partner countries, formed in three successive waves and reflecting the transition from unconditional aid to conditional aid and further to development finance. The central conclusion consists in confirming the hypothesis that this architecture has not eliminated but merely modified the classical dependency trap: dependency on the volume of aid has been transformed into dependency on a particular model of the donor paradigm and on one's own position within the architecture of the global competition of the great powers. The three institutions, USAID, the MCC and the DFC, form an institutional realization of the concept of

smart power, combining soft influence through attractiveness, conditional influence through the reward of reforms and financial-investment influence through the mobilization of capital. The introduction of the category of the economics of sanctions and the demonstration of its place within the system of economic containment reveal that conditional aid and coercive statecraft constitute two poles of a single logic: the reward of loyal partners and the restraint of rivals are two sides of one strategy of structural power.

The comparative analysis of the Western and the Chinese architectures of development finance permits a further conclusion of a higher order of generality. The two paradigms differ not in the presence or absence of the dependency trap but in the modality through which structural power is exercised: the American architecture disciplines the partner country ex ante, through the normative pre-structuring of the space of the possible by means of qualifying conditionality, whereas the Chinese architecture binds it ex post, through the material post-structuring of the realized by means of infrastructural and technological dependency. The coexistence of these two paradigms does not liberate the recipient country from the dependency trap but transfers it to a meta-level: the very choice between the Western and the Chinese alternatives becomes the mechanism of capture, since each alternative carries an embedded geopolitical vector and a position of neutrality is not available. In this light the dependency trap reveals itself not as a defect of the architecture of development assistance but as its constitutive principle, and smart power discloses itself as the highest form of structural power, one that structures the very space of the possible so that the outcome desired by the donor appears to the partner country as the result of its own free choice.

For recipient countries, and for Ukraine, the practical implication consists in the necessity of constructing a differentiated strategy of interaction with each instrument of the architecture separately and with the system as a whole. An understanding of the embedded motivations of USAID, the MCC and the DFC allows a partner country to preserve its negotiating space and its capacity for development, avoiding both the classical dependency on the volume of aid and its modified form, dependency on a single model of the donor paradigm. Further research should be directed toward the empirical verification of the proposed theoretical model of paradigmatic and positional dependency on the material of concrete recipient countries, and toward the elaboration of practical recommendations for the optimization of Ukraine's interaction with American development institutions under the conditions of the competition of the two architectures of development finance.

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ІСТОРИЧНІ АСПЕКТИ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ АМЕРИКАНСЬКОЇ ІНСТИТУЦІЙНОЇ АРХІТЕКТУРИ СПРИЯННЯ РОЗВИТКУ: ПАСТКИ ЗАЛЕЖНОСТІ В СИСТЕМІ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ДИПЛОМАТІЇ

Анотація. Метою статті є системний аналіз американської інституційної архітектури сприяння розвитку, що сформувалася впродовж шести десятиліть у три послідовні хвилі, та обґрунтування тези, що ця архітектура не подолала, а лише модифікувала класичну пастку залежності. Якщо у 1960-х–1980-х рр. йшлося про залежність від обсягу допомоги, то у 2000-х–2020-х рр. вона перетворилася на залежність від конкретної моделі донорської парадигми, яка звужує переговорний простір країни-партнера у виборі між західними і незахідними, передусім китайськими, альтернативами. Три ключові інституції, Агентство США з міжнародного розвитку (USAID), Корпорація викликів тисячоліття (MCC) та Корпорація фінансування міжнародного розвитку США (DFC), розглядаються не як окремі агенції, а як цілісна система, що відображає еволюцію самого розуміння того, чим є розвиток. Перша хвиля, що асоціювалась зі створенням USAID у 1961 р., вписувалася в логіку холодної війни і теорії модернізації; друга хвиля, заснування MCC у 2004 р., постала як відповідь на емпіричну критику донорської парадигми та реактуалізацію інституційної економіки; третя хвиля, створення DFC у 2019 р., відображає геоекономічну логіку конкуренції з китайською Ініціативою «Пояс і шлях». Окрему увагу приділено категорії економіки санкцій та її місцю в системі економічного стримування, оскільки обумовлена допомога і примусова економічна дипломатія становлять два полюси єдиного континууму структурування стимулів. Показано, що архітектуру донорства слід розуміти як інституційну реалізацію концепції розумної сили.

Ключові слова: економічна дипломатія; геоекономіка; геополітика; інституційна архітектура сприяння розвитку; фінансування міжнародного розвитку; донорська допомога; політика санкцій; пастка залежності; конкуренція; м'яка сила; Пояс і Шлях; США; КНР.

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